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Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective
prosecution must be ensured . . . .
1
– Preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

I. INTRODUCTION
The legal framework of the International Criminal Court (ICC or Court)
reflects significant historical advances made in the investigation and
prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes before international
criminal courts. This Article considers some of those key historical
developments and how they are reflected in the ICC’s legal framework.
As the Deputy Prosecutor of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the
Court has stated:
Obviously, no treaty or court judgment can remedy the consequences of
sexual violence or undo a society’s gender attitudes that often increase
the suffering to include shame and guilt. The Rome Statute and Rules of
Evidence and Procedure however provide a strong basis for addressing
successfully rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity. The codification of a mandate to end impunity for
these acts is indeed a significant step in the right direction. It was high
time that such crimes cease to be regarded as “inevitable-by-products” of
2
war and receive the serious attention that they deserve.

The importance of sexual and gender-based crimes to the Court is
demonstrated, for instance, by the requirement under the Rome Statute of
the ICC (the Statute) that appropriate measures are taken to ensure the
effective investigation and prosecution of any crime within the jurisdiction
of the Court “in particular where it involves sexual violence, gender
violence or violence against children.”3
This Article explores two complementary methods to ensure that there is
an effective investigation and prosecution of this category of crimes: first,
to take a “focused” approach and, second, to “mainstream” the approach to
sexual and gender-based crimes throughout the process, as has been the
policy of the Prosecutor of the ICC since 2003. This Article examines the
example of this dual-approach taken in the investigation in Uganda, in
which the OTP brought charges against members of the high command of
the Lords Resistance Army (LRA).4
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
183/9, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1002, 1030 (entered into force July 1, 2002)
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
2. Fatou Bensouda, Gender and Sexual Violence Under the Rome Statute, in
FROM HUMAN RIGHTS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: STUDIES IN HONOUR OF AN
AFRICAN JURIST, THE LATE JUDGE LAÏTY KAMA 401, 416 (Emmanuel Decaux et al.
eds., 2007).
3. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 54(1)(b).
4. See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, Warrant of Arrest Unsealed Against
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Investigations undertaken in the context of armed conflicts invariably
uncover instances of massive criminality, often conducted on a widespread
or systematic basis. In this context, it is crucial that investigations and
prosecutions are focused to be effective. Careful selections need to be
made regarding the scope and focus of any investigation or prosecution in a
case.
A focused approach to sexual and gender-based violent crimes must be
taken from the outset, during the pre-analysis phase and before any
decision is made to initiate an investigation in any country. The OTP
analyzes the available information to determine, based on the standards set
in the Statute for jurisdiction, admissibility, and gravity, whether there is a
legal basis for investigation. The OTP has stated that it will “endeavour to
do a selection of cases that represent the entire criminality and modes of
victimisation” and pay particular attention to methods of investigations of
sexual and gender-based crimes, as well as crimes committed against
children.5
Once a decision is made to investigate and before the investigation
commences, the OTP considers the following issues: what are the most
serious of the crimes, if any, being perpetrated within the Court’s
jurisdiction, including sexual and gender-based crimes? What is the most
appropriate factual context for investigating those crimes, for example,
what are the key factual incident(s)? Who are the groups and individuals
that appear most responsible for those crimes?
The OTP’s focused and mainstreamed approach to sexual and genderbased crimes is also reflected by ensuring that the staff involved in
investigation and prosecution of these crimes has the necessary expertise
and knowledge. Specifically, the OTP established in-house expertise on
sexual and gender-based crimes in a number of ways. The Gender and
Children’s Unit was established to provide advice and assistance to the
OTP divisions, including for sexual and gender-based crimes, during all
phases (from the pre-analysis phase onwards). More recently, the ICC
Prosecutor appointed a Special Gender Adviser, Professor Catharine
MacKinnon,6 and the Deputy Prosecutor remains the key focal point for the
OTP regarding this category of crimes. Moreover, each joint team7 on a
Five LRA Commanders (Oct. 13, 2005) (outlining a pattern of severe crimes
committed by the LRA).
5. See THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 5,
7 (Sept. 14, 2006) (stating that a principle guiding Prosecutorial Strategy is that of
“focused investigations and prosecutions”). See also Regulations of the Office of the
Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09 (Apr. 23, 2009) [hereinafter OTP Regulations].
Regulation 34 provides that: “[i]n each provisional case hypothesis, the joint team shall
aim to select incidents reflective of the most serious crimes and the main types of
victimisation—including sexual and gender violence and violence against children—
and which are the most representative of the scale and impact of the crimes.”
6. See Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor Appoints Prof.
Catharine A. MacKinnon as Special Advisor on Gender Crimes (Nov. 26, 2008).
7. Joint teams are comprised of members of the three divisions of the OTP, the
Investigations Division, Prosecutions Division, and Jurisdiction, Cooperation and
Complementarity Division. Each of the joint teams—the core operational units of the
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case includes focal point(s) who coordinate the work undertaken by the
OTP on this category of crimes. In addition to these efforts, the OTP has
sought to make all members of joint teams knowledgeable of the legal
framework relevant to sexual and gender-based crimes, and to ensure that
investigators implement best practices when conducting interviews with
victims of sexual and gender-based crimes. To accomplish this goal, the
OTP provides the relevant training to all of its investigators and lawyers.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF
SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED CRIMES BEFORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
The gender-based nature of crimes committed during armed conflicts is
not a recent phenomenon. Accounts of wars indicate that throughout
history there have been instances of widespread or systematic sexual
violence and a gendered-form of victimization of women and men during
wartime.8 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in its most recent
resolution regarding violence against women and children in situations of
armed conflict, recalled the range of sexual violence offenses addressed in
the Rome Statute and the statutes of the ad hoc international criminal
tribunals. The UNSC reiterated its
deep concern that, despite its repeated condemnation of violence against
women and children in situations of armed conflict, including sexual
violence in situations of armed conflict, and despite its calls addressed to
all parties to armed conflict for the cessation of such acts with immediate
effect, such acts continue to occur, and in some situations have become
9
systematic and widespread, reaching appalling levels of brutality.
office—works on different cases (currently relating to the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, North Uganda, Darfur, and Central African Republic) and is supported by these
three divisions of the OTP. Regulation 32 of the OTP Regulations, which provides that
“[e]ach joint team shall be composed of staff from the 3 Divisions in order to ensure a
coordinated approach throughout the investigation . . . . Upon confirmation of the
charges, an interdivisional trial team is formed to carry out prosecutions.” OTP
Regulations, supra note 5.
8. See Bensouda, supra note 2, at 401; see also KELLY DAWN ASKIN, WAR
CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS
1, 49 (1997); Agnès Callamard, Introduction to AMNESTY INT’L PUBLICATIONS & THE
INT’L CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & DEMOCRATIC DEV., INVESTIGATING WOMEN’S
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ARMED CONFLICTS 11, 12 (2001); Christine Chinkin, GenderRelated Crimes: A Feminist Perspective, in FROM SOVEREIGN IMPUNITY TO
INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY: THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE IN A WORLD OF STATES
116, 122 (Ramesh Thakur & Peter Malcontent eds., 2004). See generally SUSAN
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 31-113 (1975).
9. S.C. Res. 1820, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008); see also
Bensouda, supra note 2, at 402 (observing that, as of 2007, “despite the creation of the
United Nations and the establishment of a broad range of humanitarian law and human
rights instruments, rape and other forms of sexual violence during armed conflict are
still common practice. Furthermore, evidence indicates that sexual violence during
armed conflict has taken a new dimension”); Tamara L. Tompkins, Prosecuting Rape
as a War Crime: Speaking the Unspeakable, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 845, 847-71
(1995) (citing examples of rapes “conducted on a systematic basis and massive scales”
from the ancient world’s wars, the Middle Ages, and the fifteenth through twenty-first
centuries). Tompkins also refers to BROWNMILLER, supra note 8, at 85, who quoted a
Bengali politician’s response to why many Bengali women were raped by Pakistani
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However, there have been relatively few prosecutions of international
crimes historically, let alone sexual and gender-based crimes, before ad hoc
international criminal courts.10 In 1997, Kelly Askin observed:
[s]exual assault has been increasingly outlawed through the years, but
this prohibition has rarely been enforced. Consequently, rape and other
forms of sexual assault have thrived in wartime, progressing from a
perceived incidental act of the conqueror, to a reward of the victor, to a
11
discernable mighty weapon of war.

The earliest documented prosecution of sexual violence crimes before an
international criminal court was in the 1474 trial of Sir Hagenbach, who
was convicted for rapes committed by his troops. Yet the rapes were only
considered illegal because the war itself was “undeclared,” thus considered
unjust and illegal.12 Gender-based war crimes were prosecuted, albeit to a
limited extent, after World War II before an international criminal tribunal,
soldiers in 1971: “What do soldiers talk about in barracks? Women and sex. Put a gun
in their hands and tell them to go out and frighten the wits out of a population and what
will be the first thing that leaps to their minds?” Tompkins continues, “[t]his mindset
helps explain the extensive use of rape in particularly humiliating ways during war.”
Tompkins, supra, at 871. She further argues that wartime rape says to a woman “you
are a marginal, expendable, peripheral, essentially useless, sub-human being. You are
here for me to humiliate in order that your men understand just who is winning this
war.” See id. at 877.
10. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, History of International Investigations and
Prosecution, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3, 5 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
Transnational Publishers 2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter Bassiouni, History of International
Investigations and Prosecution]; see also Dorean M. Koenig & Kelly D. Askin,
International Criminal Law and the International Criminal Court Statute: Crimes
Against Women, in 2 WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 3, 9 (Kelly D.
Askin & Dorean M. Koenig eds., 2000) (“Gender-based and sex-based crimes
committed predominantly against women have rarely been formally recognized and
prosecuted in the international arena.”).
11. ASKIN, supra note 8, at 19; see also Eve La Haye, Article 8(2)(b)(xxii)—Rape,
Sexual Slavery, Enforced Prostitution, Forced Pregnancy, Enforced Sterilisation, and
Sexual Violence, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 184, 185 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) [hereinafter
ICC: CRIMES, PROCEDURE & EVIDENCE] (“Rape and sexual assaults on women have
often been used as a method of warfare, and, in the words of the Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, as a means to
‘humiliate, shame, degrade, and terrify the entire . . . group.’”).
12. ASKIN, supra note 8, at 5, 28-29 (noting that Hagenbach’s trial was held in
Breisach, Germany, before twenty-seven judges of the Holy Roman Empire, including
Swiss, Alsatian, and German judges). Askin observes that it was considered
“acceptable” to rape women, but that “it was because this particular war was
undeclared, and thus unjust, that the abuses were considered illegal.” Askin also argues
that Hagenbach’s conviction for rape perpetrated by his forces “is evidence that in
customary norms of warfare, rape was considered a serious violation and commanders
could be held personally responsible for failing to halt these crimes.” Id. See also
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
349 (1999) (citing GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 462-66 (1968), who described the trial of
1474 in which Hagenbach, a knight in the employ of the Duke Charles of Burgundy,
was charged with murder, rape, perjury, and other crimes by omission). The crimes
were perpetrated by Hagenbach’s subordinates in Breisach town. Hagenbach was
placed in charge of the area and had been pledged to the Duke of Burgundy by the
Archduke of Austria. The court denied his defense of superior orders and he was
stripped of his knighthood for failing to prevent the crimes, which was his duty as a
knight. Hagenbach was executed. Id. See also Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 9
(noting that this was the first recorded international criminal court).
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the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Tribunal).13
The Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal (Tokyo Charter)14 did not include
explicit reference to rape.15 Nevertheless, rape charges were brought
against Japanese defendants as war crimes, particularly with regard to the
widespread rapes Japanese soldiers committed against civilians in Nanking
in 1937.16
Rapes of civilian women and female medical personnel were
successfully prosecuted in Tokyo under the categories of inhumane
treatment, ill-treatment, and failure to respect family honor and rights. The
then Foreign Minister Hirota, Admiral Toyoda, and General Matsui were
charged with command responsibility for the violations of the laws or
customs of war committed by their soldiers in Nanking. Hirota and Matsui
were convicted of these charges.17 Various military tribunals of the Allied
13. ASKIN, supra note 8, at 14.
14. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 5,

Jan. 19, 1946 (as amended Apr. 26, 1946), 4 Bevans 21, reprinted in 1 BENJAMIN
FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION 523 (1975) (referring to the
“conventional war crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war,” and
crimes against humanity including “enslavement . . . and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population”). With regard to crimes against humanity,
the Charter provides that “[l]eaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices
participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to
commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any
person in execution of such plan.” See id.
15. Machteld Boot, Crimes Against Humanity, Article 7(1)(g): Rape . . . or Any
Other Form of Sexual Violence of Comparable Gravity, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY
ARTICLE 159, 207 (Otto Triffterer ed., Christopher Hall rev., 2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE].
16. See id.; see also 1 THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR
EAST, THE TOKYO JUDGMENT 29 APRIL 1946 – 12 NOVEMBER 1948, at 389 (B.V.A
Roling & C.F.Ruter eds., 1977) (finding that “[a]pproximately 20,000 cases of rape
occurred within the city during the first month of occupation,” and that “[m]any women
were killed after the act and their bodies mutilated”); BROWNMILLER, supra note 8, at
57-62 (noting that this case came to be known as the “Rape of Nanking”); Callamard,
supra note 8, at 41-42 (observing that the U.N. Commission of Experts established to
investigate rape and sexual assault in the former Yugoslavia noted that during the
Tokyo trials, rape was considered a violation of the “laws and customs of war” and
arguing that the charges indicated that rape was seen as a crime as serious as torture
and murder); Catherine N. Niarchos, Women, War, and Rape: Challenges Facing the
International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 649, 666 (1995)
(“These charges did not include evidence concerning the ‘comfort women,’ a term
which refers to the forced prostitution of women in brothels by the Japanese
government before and during the Second World War.”).
17. See THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST, supra note
16, at 445-46. Although there is no explicit reference to rape, Commander Hata was
also found responsible for war crimes perpetrated in 1938 and from 1941 to 1944 when
he was in command of expeditionary forces in China. Atrocities were “committed on a
large scale by the troops under his command and were spread over a long period of
time.” Id. He was found guilty under count fifty-five as he either “knew of these
things and took no steps to prevent their occurrence, or he was indifferent and made no
provision for learning whether orders for the humane treatment of prisoners of war and
civilians were obeyed.” Id. See also Bensouda, supra note 2, at 404 (explaining that
Commander Hata was found responsible for criminal acts including rape); Michael
Cottier, Article 8: War Crimes, para. 2(b)(xxii): Rape and Other Forms of Sexual
Violence, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 15, at 433; BASSIOUNI,
supra note 12, at 348. He refers in particular to the cases against General Yamashita
and Admiral Toyoda (citing William Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes,
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forces also prosecuted rape cases, including the U.S. Military Commission,
which convicted General Yamashita for command responsibility for rape as
a war crime,18 and the Chinese Military Tribunal, which convicted Takashi
Sakai for rape and mutilation of women.19
Foreign Minister Hirota and General Matsui, the Commander-in-Chief of
the Central China Area Army, were prosecuted before the Tokyo Tribunal.
Hirota was found liable for inaction amounting to criminal negligence for
relying on assurances from the Japanese War Ministry to stop atrocities that
he knew were not being implemented.20 General Matsui and his troops
captured Nanking in 1937. Matsui was found criminally responsible for
failure in his duty to “control his troops and protect” the civilians of
Nanking. The Tokyo Tribunal found that he must have known that
thousands of rapes and other atrocities were happening and that, although
he issued orders for his troops to act with “propriety,” he must have known
that his orders were of no effect.21
28 MIL. L. REV. 1, 69-73 (1973), who refers to Admiral Toyoda’s trial, in which he was
acquitted on all charges).
18. See Cottier, supra note 17, at 433 n.795 (citing 2 THE LAW OF WAR: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Leon Friedman ed., 1972)) (noting that in the Yamashita
case, the U.S. Military Commission stated that “where murder and rape . . . are
widespread offences, and there is no effective attempt by a commander to discover and
control the criminal acts, such a commander may be held responsible, even criminally
liable, for the lawless acts of his troops . . .”). See generally BASSIOUNI, supra note 12,
at 348 (citing the cases against Admiral Toyoda and General Yamashita and referring
to the details of the case against Admiral Toyoda as described by Parks, supra note 17,
at 69-73).
19. See NOËLLE N.R. QUENIVET, SEXUAL OFFENCES IN ARMED CONFLICT &
INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (2005) (referring to the case against Takashi Sakai before the
Chinese War Crimes Military Tribunal of the Ministry of National Defense, Nanking,
29 August 1946, reprinted in the U.N. War Crimes Commission, 13 LAW REPORTS OF
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, Case No. 79, at 138).
20. See THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST, supra note
16, at 448. Hirota was found guilty of count fifty-five, which charged him with rape.
He received reports of atrocities immediately after Japanese forces entered Nanking in
1937. Though Hirota received assurances from the War Ministry that the atrocities
would be stopped, they continued for at least a month. Id. The Tokyo Tribunal
decided that
Hirota was derelict in his duty in not insisting before the Cabinet that
immediate action be taken to put an end to the atrocities, failing any other
action open to him to bring about the same result. He was content to rely on
assurances which he knew were not being implemented whilst hundreds of
murders, violations of women, and other atrocities were being committed
daily. His inaction amounts to criminal negligence.
Id.
21. See THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST, supra note
16, at 453-54. The Tokyo Tribunal said, with regard to the thousands of rapes and
other atrocities, that Matsui was in Nanking City for five to seven days and that
[f]rom his own observations and from the reports of his staff he must have
been aware of what was happening . . . . The Tribunal is satisfied that Matsui
knew what was happening. He did nothing, or nothing effective to abate these
horrors. He did issue orders before the capture of the City enjoining propriety
of conduct upon his troops and later he issued further orders to the same
purport. These orders were of no effect as it is now known, and as he must
have known . . . . He had the power, as he had the duty, to control his troops
and to protect the unfortunate citizens of Nanking. He must be held criminally
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Despite the express charge of rape, not one of the female victims was
called to give evidence before the Tokyo Tribunal.22 Rape was essentially
subsumed under the general charges of command responsibility for the
atrocities in Nanking23 and seen as ancillary to the other war crimes.24
Moreover, the Tokyo Tribunal did not consider any of the evidence
regarding the thousands of so-called “comfort women” forced into sexual
slavery or enforced prostitution in Japanese military brothels.25
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg
(Nuremberg Charter),26 and Nuremberg Principles27 also did not contain
any explicit reference to rape or other crimes of sexual violence.28
Nevertheless, Cherif Bassiouni argues that rape was implicitly included in
both the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters as a crime against humanity by
being “subsumed within the words ‘or other inhumane acts’”;29 he argues
that rape and sexual violence “clearly constitute ‘inhumane acts.’”30
Bassiouni also agrues that rape was also implicitly included as a war crime
by being subsumed within the term “ill treatment.”31
In her treatise on prosecution of war crimes against women before
international criminal tribunals, Kelly Askin excerpts transcripts from the
trial of the German Major War Criminals before the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg (Nuremberg Tribunal).
French and Soviet
prosecutors introduced evidence of sexual and gender-based crimes which
Askin describes as “evidence of vile and tortuous rape, forced prostitution,
forced sterilization, forced abortion, pornography, sexual mutilation, and
sexual sadism.”32 In spite of this evidence, no defendants were explicitly
responsible for his failure to discharge this duty.
Id. Matsui was found guilty of count fifty-five, which also related to the rapes. In
regard to the widespread nature of the crimes, the Tokyo Tribunal observed that
although there was an attempt to claim that the atrocities were not extensive, that
“contrary evidence of neutral witnesses of different nationalities and undoubted
responsibility is overwhelming.” Id.
22. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 8, at 58.
23. See Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime, 34 CASE W. RES.
J. INT’L L. 277, 279 (2002).
24. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 348 (noting the grey area between
responsibility and exoneration in international law).
25. See Goldstone, supra note 23, at 279; see also Bensouda, supra note 2, at 404;
Tompkins, supra note 9, at 864-65.
26. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Criminal Investigations and
Prosecutions: From Versailles to Rwanda, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra
note 10, at 69-71, app. 3 (reprinting Charter of the International Military Tribunal,
Annexed to the London Agreement, 1945).
27. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, [1950] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 374, ILC
Report A/1316 (A/5/12).
28. See Boot, supra note 15, at 207.
29. See ASKIN, supra note 8, at 125 (citing BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 164).
30. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 344.
31. See id. at 348; see also Tompkins, supra note 9, at 883 (stating that sexual
atrocities were proscribed by Principle IV(b) of the Nuremberg Charter, which referred
to ill treatment, and Principle IV(c), which referred to inhumane acts).
32. ASKIN, supra note 8, at 97.
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prosecuted or convicted for sexual crimes before the Nuremberg Tribunal.33
Askin argues that the failure to explicitly prosecute these crimes was
compounded by the prosecutors’ frequent failure to publicly document the
crimes.34 Askin concludes, “[w]hether it was out of shyness, prudishness,
reserve, ignorance, revulsion, confusion, or intentional omission, the lack
of both public documentation and official prosecution gave impetus to the
notion that sexual assaults were less important crimes.”35 The judgment of
the Nuremberg Tribunal (Nuremberg Judgment) makes no explicit mention
of rape and it has been argued it was not prosecuted at all before the
Nuremberg Tribunal.36 Nevertheless, even though rape was not explicitly
referred to in the indictment, the transcripts of the proceedings show that
rape was indeed prosecuted. Susan Brownmiller states that Soviet
prosecutors tried to show that the rape of Russian women was part of “a
systematic Nazi campaign of terror and genocide.”37 Brownmiller further
argues that the French prosecution showed how rape was used as a form of
“military retaliation or reprisal.”38
Although rape was not explicitly mentioned, it was arguably
encompassed by the Nuremberg Tribunal’s general findings of war crimes
as ill treatment, including protection of family honor and rights, and the
crime against humanity, inhumane treatment.39 The Nuremberg Judgment
33. See Goldstone, supra note 23, at 279; see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at
345-46.
34. See ASKIN, supra note 8, at 97.
As the French prosecutor sifted through his documents, the standard censoring
mechanism that men employ when dealing with the rape of women was put
into effect. “The Tribunal will forgive me if I avoid citing the atrocious
details,” he said with gallantry. “A medical certificate from Doctor Nicolaides
who examined the women who were raped in this region—I will pass on.”
Id.
35. Id. at 97-98.
36. See Goldstone, supra note 23, at 279; see also Theodor Meron, Rape as a
Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 424, 425-26 (1993).
37. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 8, at 69 (stating that captured German
documents presented at Nuremberg corroborated the “routine use of rape as a weapon
of terror”).
38. See id. at 56.
39. See Patricia Viseur Sellers, Individual(’s) Liability for Collective Sexual
Violence, in GENDER AND HUMAN RIGHTS 153, 163 (Karen Knop ed., 2004).
The Nuremberg Tribunal, but more particularly the Tokyo Tribunal and
several subsequent national trials, produced judgments that held sexually
violent conduct during armed conflict to constitute war crimes or crimes
against humanity. Unfortunately, little strenuous legal analysis has been
produced about these judicial pronouncements, engendering the mistaken
belief among many scholars and practitioners that sex crimes were omitted,
almost entirely, from previously rendered humanitarian law jurisprudence.
Id. See also Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 10 (arguing that the fact that the trial
transcripts of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials included numerous references to
instances of sexual violence provides a “compelling argument . . . that, even though the
crimes were not specifically enumerated within the Charters, various forms of sexual
violence were indeed prosecuted in the post-World War II trials”); Tompkins, supra
note 9, at 850 (observing that although rape was not formally prosecuted at the
Nuremberg trials, allegations of rape were submitted in affidavits and entered into
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referred to how civilian populations in occupied territories were ill-treated,
tortured, murdered, and used as slave labor, and that civilian hostages were
taken in large numbers.40 In particular, the Nuremberg Tribunal referred to
ill treatment, killings, and wanton destruction of property as war crimes
under Article 6(b) of the Charter. The tribunal stated that “these provisions
are merely declaratory of the existing laws of war as expressed by the
Hague Convention, Article 46, which stated: ‘Family honour and rights, the
lives of persons and private property, as well as religious convictions and
practices must be respected.”41 The phrase “family honour and rights” has
been found to cover rape.42 The Nuremberg Tribunal found that war
crimes and crimes against humanity were committed on a vast scale, and
that inhumane acts not amounting to war crimes were crimes against
humanity.43 In finding that defendants committed crimes against humanity
of persecution of Jewish people, the Tribunal explicitly referred to the
sterilization of Jewish men and women.44
Before finding the Major War Criminals guilty of war crimes and crimes
against humanity, the Nuremberg Tribunal made a number of factual
findings regarding the charges against the defendants that were in some
instances stated in general terms that may encompass rape and other sexual
or gender-based crimes.45 For example, in the case of Keitel, the former
Chief of Staff to Nazi Germany’s Minister of War, the Nuremberg Tribunal
referred to an order Keitel issued stating that prosecution of German
soldiers for “offences against civilians” was unnecessary.46 Rosenberg, the
Nazi party’s ideologist and representative for Foreign Affairs, was found to
have “knowledge of the brutal treatment and terror to which the Eastern
people were subjected.” Frank, the Chief Civil Administration Officer for
occupied Polish territory was found to be a “willing and knowing
participant in the use of terrorism in Poland . . . .”47 Similarly, Frick, the
Reich Minister of the Interior and “Reich Protector of Bohemia and
Moravia” was found responsible for “acts of oppression,” including
“terrorism of the population” and “slave labour.”48 Von Neurath, the
former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Reich Minister Without Portfolio

evidence).
40. See INT’L MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, NUREMBERG, 30 SEPTEMBER – 1 OCTOBER
1946, at 45 (1948) [hereinafter NUREMBERG JUDGMENT].
41. Id. at 48.
42. See Meron, supra note 36, at 425.
43. See NUREMBERG JUDGMENT, supra note 40, at 65.
44. See id. at 63 (noting that Allied forces found victims in mass graves).
45. See generally id. at 84-131. However, usually specific examples were given, in
particular in the context of mass killings, persecution, concentration camps, and forced
labor.
46. See id. at 92.
47. See id. at 98.
48. See id. at 98-100 (holding that Frink was responsible because he knew of the
Reich’s policies and carried them out).
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and “Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia,” as the chief German
official in the Protectorate of Czechoslovakia, was found to play an
important role in the “wars of aggression which Germany was waging in
the East knowing that war crimes and crimes against humanity were being
committed under his authority.”49 Bormann, the head of the Nazi party
Chancellery, was found responsible for the transfer of 500,000 female
workers from “the East” to Germany as part of the slave labor program.50
It has been argued that women were “nearly invisible” in the proceedings
before the Nuremberg Tribunal.51 The Allied Control Council Law No. 10,
which allowed the Allies to prosecute German nationals in their respective
zones of occupation,52 explicitly referred to “rape, or other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population” as a crime against humanity
and “ill treatment” of civilians,53 but no prosecutions were explicitly
brought for rape on this basis.54
The first known international criminal law prosecution for “forced
prostitution” took place before the Batavia Military Tribunal in 1948.
Japanese defendants were prosecuted for the forcible abductions of Dutch
women living in “Dutch Indonesia” for rape and the “war crime of
enforced prostitution.”55
Cases of enforced sterilization were punished during the war crimes
trials in which crimes related to medical experiments conducted on
prisoners in concentration camps during the Second World War were
prosecuted. Prosecution of these crimes was before U.S., Chinese, and
Polish military courts, in addition to the Nuremberg Tribunal.56 Forced

49. See id. at 124-26.
50. See id. at 128-30.
51. See Peggy Kuo, Prosecuting Crimes of Sexual Violence in an International

Tribunal, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 305, 308 (2002) (observing that in contrast to the
Nuremberg Tribunal, the ICTY has a clear presence of women as judges, lawyers,
investigators, and witnesses).
52. See Bassiouni, supra note 26, at 45-46.
53. See id. at 79; see also Article II (1)(b)-(c), Appendix 6, Allied Control Council
Law No. 10 (1945).
54. See Boot, supra note 15, at 207 (observing that rape was defined as a crime
against humanity, but not a war crime, under Control Council Law No. 10; yet there
were no prosecutions for rape in the trials conducted on the basis of this instrument).
55. See ASKIN, supra note 8, at 85; see also Cottier, supra note 17, at 447. The
defendant Awochi was found guilty of the war crime of enforced prostitution for
forcing Dutch women to practice prostitution in the premises of the club-restaurant in
Batavia occupied by Japanese forces. The women were said to be unable to leave
freely. The war crime was defined as “[a]bduction of girls and women for the purpose
of enforced prostitution.” Id.
56. See Cottier, supra note 17, at 451; see generally U.S. Military Tribunal 1,
K. Brandt et al. (Medical Case, Case No. 1), 1-2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NEURNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1950);
Article II of the Chinese War Crimes Law (October 24, 1946), U.N. WAR CRIMES
COMM’N, 14 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 153 (1949) (referring to the
war crime of “destroying [people’s] power of procreation”); Supreme National
Tribunal of Poland, Rudolf F.F. Hoess (11-29 March 1947), U.N. WAR CRIMES
COMM’N, 7 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 153 (1948).
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abortion was also prosecuted and sexual mutilation mentioned.57
In 1974, the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3318, called on states to
make “[a]ll efforts . . . to spare women and children from the ravages of
war,” proclaiming that “[a]ll forms of repression and cruel and inhuman
treatment of women and children . . . committed by belligerents in the
course of military operations or in occupied territories shall be considered
criminal.”58 It was more than forty years after Tokyo and Nuremburg that
sexual and gender-based crimes were prosecuted before an ad hoc
international criminal tribunal. At the time of the creation of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), there were
additional international declarations calling for crimes of sexual violence,
including rape, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy, to be dealt with as
war crimes and crimes against humanity.59 The UNSC resolution leading
to the establishment of the ICTY contained the first condemnation by the
57. See Bensouda, supra note 2, at 404; see generally U.S. v. Brandt (1946), in 1-2
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NEURNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, supra note 56 (noting forced sterilization and
castration); U.S. v. Pohl (1947), in 5 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NEURNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1950)
(evidence of forced abortion and concentration camp “brothels”); U.S. v. Greifelt
(1948), in 5 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NEURNBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1950) (forced abortion, gender and
ethnic persecutions, genocide, and reproductive crimes).
58. See Cottier, supra note 17, at 434 (referring to the Declaration on the
Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 3318,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974)).
59. See Boot, supra note 15, at 207 (referring to the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights, ¶ 38, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993)). The Declaration and Programme of Action
stated that “[v]iolations of the human rights of women in situations of armed conflict
are violations of the fundamental principles of international human rights and
humanitarian law. All violations of this kind, including in particular murder, systematic
rape, sexual slavery, and forced pregnancy, require a particularly effective response.”
Id. Boot also references the U.N. General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993), adopted
Feb. 23, 1994, and its broad definition of “violence against women” and the call for
states to take measures to prevent and punish such violence. See also U.N. Econ. &
Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual
Slavery and Slavery-like Practices During Armed Conflict, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (June 22, 1998) (prepared by Gay J. McDougall) [hereinafter
U.N. Slavery Special Rapporteur Report]; ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights,
Further Promotion and Encouragement of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Including the Question of the Programme and Methods of Work of the Commission,
Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United Nations System for
Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54/Add.1 (Feb. 4, 1998) (prepared by Radhika Coomaraswamy);
ECOSOC, Comm’n on Human Rights, Further Promotion and Encouragement of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Question of the Programme
and Methods of Work of the Commission, Alternative Approaches and Ways and Means
Within the United Nations System for Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/54 (Jan. 26, 1998)
(prepared by Radhika Coomaraswamy); Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 11
(referring as well to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, ¶¶ 131-149, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (Oct. 17, 1995)); Meron, supra note 36, at 424-28 (stating that
“the massive and systematic practice of rape and its use as a ‘national’ instrument of
‘ethnic cleansing’ qualify it to be defined and prosecuted as a crime against
humanity”).
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UNSC of rape during war. Bringing to justice perpetrators of crimes such
as rape was one of the reasons that the UNSC established the ICTY.60
The ICTY statute refers explicitly to rape, as does the statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which explicitly refers
to rape and enforced prostitution.61 Both statutes classify rape as a crime
against humanity, an act that was described as ground-breaking,62 and
followed the example of the Allied Control Council Law No. 10.63 The
ICTR Statute also defines rape, enforced prostitution, and “any form of
indecent assault” as violations of Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.64 Otherwise, these sexual violence crimes were not explicitly
referred to as war crimes; there were no explicit references to any of the
other sexual violence crimes in the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals.65
The former Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR, Richard Goldstone,
said that in the early years of both tribunals he believed that there was a
“gender bias” within his office. He referred to the lack of senior female
investigators and criticized the attitude among his investigators, stating that
“[t]heir culture was not such as to make them concerned about genderrelated crime.”66 Nevertheless, rape and other sexual violence crimes were
prosecuted before the ad hoc tribunals as war crimes, crimes against

60. See S.C. Res. 827, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); Goldstone,
supra note 23, at 278; see also Chinkin, supra note 8, at 118 (referring to Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 201 (July 21,
2000), where the ICTY Appeals Chamber stated, “[t]he general question of bringing
justice to the perpetrators of crimes [such as rape] was one of the reasons that the
Security Council established the Tribunal”); Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 5
(observing that sexual violence against women was a major impetus for the
establishment of the ICTY).
61. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, art. 5(g), U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; see also Statute of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda arts. 3(g) and 4(e), Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
62. See Goldstone, supra note 23, at 278-79; see also Tompkins, supra note 9, at
850 (“The inclusion of rape as one of the enumerated crimes against humanity in
Article 5 of the Statute . . . mark[s] a watershed moment for women.”). But see Cate
Steains, Gender Issues, Chapter Twelve, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 357, 362-63
(Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (arguing that defining these crimes as crimes against humanity
rather than war crimes imposed a higher threshold to be met making it more difficult
for cases to be brought in relation to sexual violence).
63. See Patricia Viseur Sellers, Sexual Violence and Peremptory Norms: The Legal
Value of Rape, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 287, 299 (2002).
64. See ICTR Statute, art. 4(e), supra note 61; Goldstone, supra note 23, at 279.
65. See Boot, supra note 15, at 208.
66. See Goldstone, supra note 23, at 280 (stating that as Chief Prosecutor of the
ICTY and ICTR between 1994 to 1996, he decided to have an appropriate gender
policy for the Office of the Prosecutor and in this regard appointed Patricia Sellers as
the legal advisor to the Office of the Prosecutor for Gender Crimes); see also Koenig &
Askin, supra note 10, at 6 (citing Patricia Sellers, Presentation at the WILIG Luncheon
at the 93rd ASIL Annual Meeting on March 27, 1999, who stated “[i]t’s no longer
acceptable for the Tribunal investigators and trial teams to be gender-sensitive—they
need to be competent”); Kuo, supra note 51, at 310-11 (referring to investigators’
reluctance to deal with rapes).
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humanity, and as genocide.67 Goldstone explains that the first indictment
brought by the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor, against Dragan Nikolic,
included no charges for gender crimes because his office believed there
was insufficient evidence to support such charges.68 However, Goldstone
recalls that the female judge, Justice Odio Benito, with the agreement of
her two male colleagues, called upon the Prosecution to review its
indictment to add gender crimes, either as a crime against humanity or as a
grave breach or war crime. Goldstone remarked that this was a welcome
“invitation,” as prior to that “[r]ape was not traditionally regarded as a war
crime on its own, and . . . was never included amongst the . . . [grave
breaches].”69
The first indictment for rape as a war crime was in Prosecutor v.
Gagovic et al. (Foca). There, the prosecutor focused exclusively on sexual
assault and qualified rape as a violation of the ICTY’s grave breaches
provision,70 a violation of the laws and customs of war,71 as well as a crime
against humanity.72 The ICTY Trial Chamber found the three accused
guilty of the war crimes and crimes against humanity of sexual violence.73
Similarly, Goldstone describes how the female judge, Justice Pillay of
the ICTR Trial Chamber, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, elicited evidence from
witnesses from the bench regarding sexual and gender-based crimes. Here
too, the Tribunal requested that the Prosecution amend the indictments to
include crimes of sexual violence.74 The ICTR first found in the Akayesu
67. See Boot, supra note 15, at 208 n.228 (remarking that the ICTR Trial Chamber
in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 735744 (Sept. 2, 1998), was the first to render a judgment finding the defendant criminally
responsible for rape as a crime against humanity. The Prosecutor qualified rape as a
violation of the grave breaches provision (article 2), a violation of the laws and customs
of war (article 3), and as a crime against humanity (article 5) in Prosecutor v. Gagovic
(Foca), No. IT-96-23-I, Indictment (June 26, 1996)); see also Goldstone, supra note 23,
at 278 (remarking that as of 2002, the ICTR had indicted seventeen men and one
woman for gender crimes, charging them with genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes). The ICTY by then had convicted eight perpetrators of rape, held sexual
slavery to be a crime against humanity, and more than half of its public indictments,
including those against Radovan Karadzic, the former head of the Republika Srbska,
and Ratko Mladic, his army chief, incorporated gender crimes. See id.; Koenig &
Askin, supra note 10, at 6 (observing in 1999 that in the ICTY, half of the indictments
charged various forms of sexual violence, while in the ICTR less than ten percent of the
indictments charged sexual violence).
68. See Goldstone, supra note 23, at 281 (explaining that the indictment was for
multiple murders and the torture of innocent civilians).
69. See Prosecutor v. Nikolić, Case No. IT-94-2-R61, Review of Indictment
Pursuant to Rule 61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ¶¶ 5-23 (Oct. 20, 1995);
Goldstone, supra note 23, at 282 (noting that this was a “huge step forward”).
70. See ICTY Statute, supra note 61, art. 2; Boot, supra note 15, at 208 n.228.
71. See ICTY Statute, supra note 61, art. 3; see Boot, supra note 15, at 208 n.228.
72. See ICTY Statute, supra note 61, art. 5; Prosecutor v. Gagovic, Case No. IT96-23-1, Indictment, ¶ 4.8 (June 26, 1998); Boot, supra note 15, at 208 n.228; see also
Goldstone, supra note 23, at 283 (noting activism from judges and the Office of the
Prosecutor in the area of gender-related crimes).
73. See Kuo, supra note 51, at 305 (questioning whether the ICTY’s verdict
marked progress).
74. See Goldstone, supra note 23, at 282 (remarking that this led to the
postponement of the trial and amendment of the indictment to include charges of sexual
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case a defendant criminally responsible for rape as a crime against
humanity.75 The Trial Chamber held in the Akayesu case, and later in the
Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, that rape can constitute a form of genocide.76
Enslavement was included as a charge in several indictments issued by the
ICTR and ICTY. For example, in Prosecutor v. Gagovic et al. (Foca),
charges were included in the indictment for forcible sexual penetration of a
person or forcing a person to penetrate another sexually.77 The Trial
Chamber found that rape was used as an “instrument of terror” in the
course of ethnic cleansing, and defined slavery.78
Sexual violence has been prosecuted before the ad hoc tribunals as acts
of genocide,79 rape,80 torture,81 enslavement,82 persecution,83 inhumane acts
as crimes against humanity and war crimes,84 other acts of sexual violence
such as forced nudity,85 and other grave breaches, or violations of the laws
violence against displaced women who sought refuge at the Taba Commune); see also
Bensouda, supra note 2, at 406 (describing how two witnesses spontaneously gave
evidence regarding sexual violence, prompting the judges to question these witnesses
and invite the prosecution to consider investigating gender crimes and amending the
indictment).
75. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶¶ 735-744 (Sept. 2, 1998); see also Boot, supra note 15, at 208 n.228.
76. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 733; see also
Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 291-293
(June 17, 2004); Bensouda, supra note 2, at 407 (explaining how the Akayesu Trial
Chamber Judgment punished sexual violence as a war crime in the context of an
internal armed conflict, confirming that sexual violence could be prosecuted
irrespective of whether it was an internal or international armed conflict). See
generally Catherine MacKinnon, The ICTR’s Legacy on Sexual Violence, 14 NEW ENG.
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 211 (2008).
77. See Prosecutor v. Gagovic et al., Case No. IT-96-23-I, Indictment, ¶ 4.8 (June
26, 1996); Christopher Hall, Crimes Against Humanity, Article 7(1)(c): Enslavement,
in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 15, at 193 n.152; see also Koenig
& Askin, supra note 10, at 18 (referring to the indictment for enslavement in
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-I, Amended Indictment, ¶¶ 9.1, 10.1 (July
13, 1998), stating the charges of crimes against humanity and enslavement).
78. See Kuo, supra note 51, at 318-19; see also Chinkin, supra note 8, at 122
(referencing the Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Trial Chamber Judgment, Case Nos. IT96-23/T & IT-96-23/1-T, ¶ 576 (Feb. 22, 2001); Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic,
Case Nos. IT-95-5-R61 & IT-95-18-R61, Review of Indictments Pursuant to Rule 61
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (July 11, 1996); Prosecutor v. Karadzic &
Mladic, Case Nos. IT-95-18-R61 & IT-95-5-R61, Transcript of Hearing, ¶ 64
(July 2, 1996)).
79. See Sellers, supra note 39, at 163 (referencing Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 731).
80. See id. (referencing Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶ 686; Kunarac et al., Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, ¶ 655).
81. See id. (referencing, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T,
Trial Chamber Judgment (Nov. 2, 2001)).
82. See id. (referencing Kunarac et al., Case Nos. IT-96-23/1-T & IT-96-23/1-T,
¶¶ 738-739, 742).
83. See id. (referencing Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment).
84. See id. (referencing Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 210-272 (July 21, 2000); Prosecutor v. Delalic et al (“Celebici
Trial Chamber Judgment”), Case. No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment,¶ 1066 (Nov. 16 1998)).
85. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 10A.
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and customs of war such as outrages upon personal dignity, cruel treatment,
and wilfully causing great suffering.86 In 2002, Richard Goldstone
remarked upon key successes of both ad hoc tribunals:87
[m]en had written the laws of war in an age when rape was regarded as
being no more than an inevitable consequence of war. The two UN
Tribunals truly represent a distinct shift in mindset.
They are
characterized as having the specific intent to prosecute the perpetrators
of sexual assaults. In fulfilling that intent, the Tribunals have advanced
the substance of international humanitarian law through defining rape,
sexual violence, and sexual slavery and broadening the categories of
international crime under which judicial bodies can prosecute gender
crimes . . . . I would suggest the jurisprudence of the Tribunals in this
important area is positive. They have also not avoided telling the detail
of the stories of the witnesses and victims.

Nevertheless, Goldstone, and other former ICTY staff, also describe
certain prosecutorial challenges faced by the ad hoc tribunals. Goldstone
states that one of the problems faced by the Office of the Prosecutor of the
ICTY and ICTR in charging rape as a war crime, before Akayesu, was that
the crime did not have an explicit definition under international law at the
time. He observes that the Trial Chamber in Akayesu “took a major step
toward filling this gap in the law.”88 Goldstone refers in particular to their
definition of rape as a “physical invasion of a sexual nature committed on a
person under circumstances which are coercive.”89
Former ICTY Prosecutor Peggy Kuo observed that in the early years of
the ICTY one policy concern considered was whether crimes against
women should be kept separate or “incorporated and mainstreamed into
other indictments.”90 In the end, both approaches were implemented
simultaneously.91 The former ICTY Gender Legal Expert Patricia Viseur
Sellers described how individuals were held accountable before the ICTY
for “collective sexual violence.”92 She argues that war, systematic attacks
86. See Boot, supra note 15, at 208 n.228 (referencing Prosecutor v. Gagovic et al.,
Case No. IT-96-23-1, Indictment, ¶ 7.12 (June 26, 1996) (the defendants were charged
with rape as a specific and separate crime, as a violation of the grave breaches
provision (art. 2), a violation of the laws and customs of war (art. 3), and as a crime
against humanity (art. 5)).
87. See Goldstone, supra note 23, at 279, 284; see also Koenig & Askin, supra
note 10, at 5-6 (stating “[t]he traditional culture of silencing or ignoring crimes against
women is increasingly being remedied in the 1990s. Due especially to concentrated
lobbying by women’s groups and the broader participation and presence of women in
various international fora, crimes committed predominantly against women are being
condemned and prosecuted.”).
88. See Goldstone, supra note 23, at 283.
89. See id. (noting how the ICTR Trial Chamber held that “the central elements of
the crime of rape should not be captured in a mechanical description of objects and
body parts”; and that “[s]exual violence, which includes rape, is considered to be any
act of a sexual nature, which is committed on a person under circumstances which are
coercive”).
90. See Kuo, supra note 51, at 310.
91. See id. (stating that initially the concern was whether separating or
mainstreaming would give too much or too little prominence to such crimes).
92. See Sellers, supra note 39, at 153.
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on civilians, and genocide “breed collective criminal conduct,” and that in
this context “the susceptibility of sexual violence to collective conduct
seems predictable. The number of individuals eventually charged and tried
for these crimes, in truth, only hint at the total number of perpetrators.”93
Viseur Sellers also observed that before the ICTY, the Trial Chambers and
Appeals Chamber dealt with the phenomenon of collective sexual violence
by using a form of direct liability not expressly provided for under the
ICTY statute, against military and political superiors, namely, “coperpetration or joint criminal enterprise . . . based upon a perpetrator
undertaking to participate in criminal conduct with a plurality of actors.”94
She argues further that the common purpose doctrine could be an “engine
of liability for sexual violence” in cases against leaders.95 In Prosecutor v.
Krsztic, the ICTY Trial Chamber found General Krsztic liable for
“incidental” rapes and other crimes that resulted from a joint criminal
enterprise to execute forced transfers.96 Viseur Sellers observed that the
Trial Chamber chose not to place any relevance on General Krzstic’s
specific knowledge, or lack thereof, of sexual violence and instead
“reasoned that because of his acquiescence to the collective plan to cleanse
the area he knowingly assumed the risk that other crimes, such as sex-based
crimes, would occur.”97 Viseur Sellers concluded “[t]hat wartime sexual
assault crimes are ostensibly characterised as the natural and foreseeable
consequences of other violations is landmark jurisprudence. It reverses the
inevitable conventional belief that wartime sexual abuse is either the

93. See id.; see also Chinkin, supra note 8, at 121 (arguing that “the cases before
the ad hoc tribunals present a number of reasons for sexual violence” and “confirm that
rape and sexual abuse of the civilian population are public crimes of violence inherent
in the aims of the warring parties. They are not the private or personal acts of
individual fighters that can somehow be distanced from the broader picture.”).
94. See Sellers, supra note 39, at 176-77. Sellers describes that the Appeals
Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
¶¶ 196-204 (July 15, 1999), found three forms of common purpose doctrine: first, coperpetration where all participants in the common design possess the same criminal
intent to commit a crime; second, the “concentration camp” cases, where there is
knowledge of the nature of the system of ill treatment and intent to further the common
design of ill treatment (which intent can be proved by inference from the accused’s
authority within the camp or organization hierarchy); and third, where there is intent to
take part in a joint criminal enterprise and the possible commission by other members
of the enterprise of other offences that do not constitute the objects of the common
criminal purpose are foreseeable and nevertheless willingly took the risk. Id. Sellers
describes that the Appeals Chamber in Tadic found that the
actus reus of the common purpose doctrine is satisfied when there exist:
plurality of persons; a plan, design or purpose that may have been previously
arranged or that may materialize extemporaneously; and participation of the
accused in the common purpose by commission, or assistance in, or
contribution to a specific crime under the Statute.
Id. There was no need for evidence of a prior agreement. See also Prosecutor v. Tadic,
Case No. IT-94-I-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 227 (July 15, 1999).
95. See Sellers, supra note 39, at 156 (referring specifically to the potential use of
the common purpose doctrine in the Milosevic case).
96. Id. at 182-85; see Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, ¶ 2 (Aug. 2, 2001).
97. See Sellers, supra note 39, at 184.
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unrelated, variant conduct of individual soldiers, or the consequence of
soldiers obeying superior orders.”98 She also refers to Prosecutor v.
Kvocka, in which the ICTY Trial Chamber found the accused liable as a
co-perpetrator where “the presence of female detainees and the unruly
demeanour of the guards would presage the occurrence of sexual
violence.”99 Viseur-Sellers argues that there exists a
myth [that] . . . sexual violence is not justiciable unless there is proof of a
superior’s order, or proof that rapes were systematic. The common
purpose doctrine trounces that myth. Sexual violence as a natural and
foreseeable consequence of other crimes, comes close to being the legal
description of the inevitable wartime sexual violence. When random or
rampant sexual violence . . . happens, as long as a co-perpetrator
knowingly assumes the risk of its occurrence, it lies within, not beyond,
100
the reach of humanitarian law.

Catharine MacKinnon also addresses issues in relation to the prosecution
of senior commanders for the perpetration of rape committed by their
forces before the ICTR. She argues that certain ICTR decisions reflect “the
pervasive reluctance to hold men responsible for their sex acts, exacerbated
by a distinct resistance to finding vicarious responsibility for sex acts other
men commit.”101 She further argues that there is a
seeming reluctance of the Tribunal, at times, to hold a man responsible
for a sexual violation another man committed, when it is willing to hold
the same man responsible for murder committed on virtually the same
evidence, at the same time and place, by and against the same
people . . . . An underlying sense also emerges that, while all these men
would not likely have killed without direct orders, perhaps they would
rape women en masse all on their own, without the supportive context of
102
the defendant’s authority.
98. See id. at 182-85 (noting that similarly in Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 2, the Trial Chamber found the accused guilty for crimes that
were a “natural and foreseeable consequence of the enterprise”). The accused was also
found guilty of the “incidental murders, rapes, beatings and abuses.” Id. Additionally,
Sellers observes
[t]he Trial Chamber found [that] . . . the sexual violence and sexual
terrorization . . . were foreseeable and consistent with the presence of a
massive, vulnerable refugee population, combined with the army and
paramilitary presence . . . . The situational context primed the foreseeability of
these crimes, even though they were beyond the scope of the original plan.
Id. at 184.
99. See id. at 186-88 (observing that the Trial Chamber in Kvocka considered the
defendants’ authority, knowledge, and intentional furtherance of the system of ill
treatment indicative of specific crimes and found that liability extended to anyone who
knowingly participated in a significant way in the enterprise); see also Bensouda, supra
note 2, at 407 (noting that the perpetrator convicted for a rape need not be the “physical
perpetrator” of the rape and describing how Furundzija was convicted despite the fact
that he was not a superior to the physical perpetrator nor did he touch the woman
himself).
100. See Sellers, supra note 39, at 192.
101. See MacKinnon, supra note 76, at 214.
102. See id. at 214-15 (citing in support of this contention Judge Ramaroson’s
dissent in Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-T, Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Ramaroson, ¶¶ 69-78 (Dec. 1, 2003)); see also Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No.
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MacKinnon considers that it is important to ensure that superiors are
successfully prosecuted and held responsible for rapes committed by their
subordinates to avoid sending a signal to the subordinates who rape “not
only that there is no chance they will be held responsible for each rape they
commit, but also that there is only a small chance their superiors will be
[held responsible].”103 MacKinnon opines that part of the problem lies in
the fact that although the nature of conflicts have changed and groups do
not always display the chain of command or formal hierarchical ordering
that characterizes traditional armed conflict per se, “the liability rules for
these crimes have observably remained subliminally stuck in their original
wartime setting.”104 She concludes, “[t]he breakthrough that would
correspond to the Akayesu achievement on the substantive level has yet to
take place on the level of accountability.”105
MacKinnon also refers to the lack of convictions before the ICTR of
superiors who raped victims themselves, arguing that the “tacit social
burden of proof in sexual assault cases seems to have survived the formal
non-existence of corroboration requirements.”106
Nevertheless, as
MacKinnon acknowledges, “[t]he fact the ICC even exists, with its
prohibitions on sexual violence . . . is due in no small part to the impetus
provided by the ad hoc tribunals, and those who gave them life by
believing in them enough to testify before them.”107
III. THE ICC’S LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEALING WITH SEXUAL AND
GENDER-BASED CRIMES
The legal framework of the ICC reflects some of the key historical
developments in investigating and prosecuting sexual and gender-based
ICTR 00-55A-T, Trial Chamber Judgment & Sentence, ¶ 531 (Sept. 12, 2006) (finding
the defendant guilty of genocide for murders, but not for rape as a crime against
humanity); Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR 96-14-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment & Sentence, ¶ 480 (May 16, 2003).
103. See MacKinnon, supra note 76, at 216-17.
104. See id. at 217.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 215; see also Kelly Dawn Askin, Gender Crimes Jurisprudence in the
ICTR: Positive Developments, 3 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1007, 1008 (2005) (“[M]any
indictments fail to bring rape charges, primarily because there has been very little
genuine and rigorous investigation of the crime by the Prosecutor’s office. This has
resulted in rape acquittals, dropped charges and other missed opportunities and
debacles.”).
107. See MacKinnon, supra note 76, at 220. MacKinnon observed that
[w]omen have achieved monumental advances in each of these bodies of law
in recent years, and crimes against women are now prosecuted on the
international stage at levels unparalleled in history. Perhaps the most
significant reason for the trend—from silencing or ignoring gender-based and
sex-based crimes to demanding and receiving accountability for at least some
of these crimes—is the growing awareness that the harm caused by sexualized
violence permeates every level of society, and that it is not only the victim and
close family and friends who suffer, but local and global society as a whole.
Id.; see also Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 29 (referring to international criminal
law, international human rights law and international humanitarian law).
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crimes before international criminal courts. In particular, the impetus to
effectively deal with these crimes and advancements in the relevant law are
reflected under the Rome Statute, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of
the Court (Rules), and Elements of Crimes (Elements), and have been taken
forward by the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court
since 2003.108
A. Gender Experts
The Statute requires that experts on sexual and gender violence
participate in all organs of the Court,109 including amongst the judges,
where there should also be a fair representation of females,110 staff of the
Victims and Witnesses Unit within the Registry,111 and advisers within the
OTP.112
108. See Pam Spees, Mainstreaming Gender in the Pursuit of International Justice
and Accountability, AFR. LEGAL AID Q., Jan.-Mar. 2003, at 21, 23 (identifying ways in
which these rules will help to facilitate witness testimony in sexual violence cases and
arguing that gender issues are mainstreamed in the Rome Statute).
109. See Bensouda, supra note 2, at 412-13 (noting that the Rome Statute is the first
international treaty establishing an international criminal court in which principles of
female representation and gender expertise have been explicitly incorporated).
Bensouda also observes that at the ICC, seven out of eighteen judges are female, many
with expertise in gender crimes. In the OTP, the Deputy Prosecutor is female; among
the budgeted posts, fifty-four percent are held by females and thirty-four percent of the
professional staff are also female. Id. See also Spees, supra note 108, at 23-24;
Steains, supra note 62, at 375-83.
110. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 36(8)(a)(iii) (requiring a “fair
representation of female and male judges” on the International Criminal Court); id. art.
36(8)(b) (providing that “[s]tate parties shall also take into account the need to include
judges with legal expertise on specific issues, including, but not limited to, violence
against women and children”); see also Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 12.
111. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 43(6) (providing that the Victims and
Witnesses Unit within the Registry “shall include staff with expertise in trauma,
including trauma related to crimes of sexual violence”); Koenig & Askin, supra note
10, at 12 (referring to Article 44(2) of the Statute, which requires that the OTP and
Registry have qualified staff ensuring “the highest standards of efficiency, competency
and integrity”); David Tolbert, Article 43: The Registry, in COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE, supra note 15, at 981, 990 (citing Rule 34 of the ICTY). Tolbert noted
[i]t was recognized at the Preparatory Committee that, in view of the types of
crimes over which the Court has jurisdiction, the staff of the Victims and
Witnesses Unit would need expertise in areas such as trauma and sexual
violence. This has also been recognized by rules of the ad hoc Tribunals,
which provide that “due consideration be given to the employment of women”
and note the areas of expertise in which counseling will need to be provided.
Id.
112. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 42(9) (providing that the Prosecutor “shall
appoint advisers with legal expertise on specific issues, including, but not limited to,
sexual and gender violence and violence against children”); see Morten Bergsmo &
Frederik Harhoff, Article 42: The Office of the Prosecutor, in COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE, supra note 15, at 971, 979.
Provided that the required expertise is available among the experts appointed
as members of the Prosecutor’s Office, article 42, ¶ 9 would seem to be
satisfied and the Prosecutor would have full authority over the utilization of all
available positions within his or her Office and gratis personnel, as required by
the Statute. It may be useful if the relevant expertise includes experience in
working with traumas and psychological or physical disorders in a judicial
context.
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B. Effective Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual and
Gender-Based Crimes
As noted above, this has been a key element of Luis Moreno-Ocampo’s
prosecutorial strategy.113 The Prosecutor is required to take appropriate
measures to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of crimes
within the Court’s jurisdiction, taking account of the nature of the crime, in
particular where it involves sexual violence, gender violence, or violence
against children.114 In doing so, there must be respect for “the interests and
personal circumstances of victims and witnesses, including their age,
gender . . . and health.”115
C. Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes Under the Statute
The various crimes listed under the Statute also reflect important
developments made before international criminal courts regarding sexual
and gender-based crimes. These crimes are considered among the “most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.”116
1. The Range of Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes Under the Statute
The Statute reflects key historical developments by the range of offenses
under which sexual violence and gender-based crimes can be prosecuted.
As Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo stated in his June 2007 speech in
Nuremberg, “Building a Future on Peace and Justice,”
[s]ubstantial law has been codified in one detailed text [the Rome
Statute]; the content of different international conventions such as the
Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions have been
incorporated; elements of the crimes have been meticulously defined;
based on the jurisprudence by the ad hoc tribunals the definition of
sexual violence has been further elaborated; special emphasis has been
117
put on crimes against children.”

a. Explicit List of Sexual Violence and Gender-Based Offences
First, the Rome Statute provides the most comprehensive and explicit list
of sexual violence and gender-based offenses under the jurisdiction of an
international criminal court. The Statute was the first to specifically
enumerate within the same instrument both sexual violence and genderbased crimes in their own right as forms of genocide, crimes against
Id.
113. See THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY,
supra note 5, at 3.
114. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 54(1)(b).
115. See id.; Steains, supra note 62, at 386.
116. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at pmbl.; see also Spees, supra note 108, at 21
(recognizing that the Rome Statute has equipped the ICC with tools reflecting a gender
perspective).
117. See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Address: Building
a Future on Peace and Justice (June 24-25, 2007).
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humanity, as well as war crimes—in both international and noninternational armed conflicts.118 These explicitly named sexual and genderbased crimes include the following.119
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group is a form
of “biological genocide.”120 Testimony before the ICTY and observations
118. See Boot, supra note 15, at 208 (referencing in particular Article 7(1)(g) and
(2)(f), as well as crimes of sexual violence dealt with under Article 8 as war crimes,
under Article 6 as genocide, and also as the crimes against humanity of torture,
persecution on the basis of gender, and “inhumane acts”); see also Bensouda, supra
note 2, at 410-11; Goldstone, supra note 23, at 285.
The statute for the [ICC] has forwardly advanced the work of the U.N.
Tribunals. Gender crimes are no longer subsumed under outrages on personal
dignity. Rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization and other
forms of sexual violence are now expressly enumerated as crimes against
humanity in Article 7 and as war crimes relating to both international armed
conflict and non-international armed conflict.
Id.; Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 12 (observing that the Women’s Caucus for
Gender Justice in the ICC was a driving force behind the inclusion of the broad array of
sex crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction, specifically as crimes against humanity and
war crimes); La Haye, supra note 11, at 185-99.
119. See Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 7 (stating that the Rome Statute “marks
a victory for humankind in that it, among other advances, acknowledges the criminality
of several gender-based and sex-based crimes and integrates those crimes into the
jurisdiction of the [ICC]”); Boot, supra note 15, at 208 & n.231.
The inclusion of rape and other crimes of sexual violence in the Rome Statute
is an important advance over previous treatment by international instruments
as violations of the honour and reputation of women, instead of as criminal
acts aimed at the physical and mental integrity of a person, which, more often
than not, constitute torture.
Id. Boot observed that the Rome Statute led to the inclusion of crimes of sexual
violence as crimes against humanity in other instruments establishing international
criminal courts, including Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of
Democratic Kampuchea art. 5, U.N. Doc. RES/57/228 (Dec. 18, 2002) [hereinafter
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia]; Statute of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone art. 2, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 145 (classifying as crimes against
humanity “[r]ape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other
form of sexual violence”); U.N. Transitional Admin. in E. Timor Regulation 2000/15,
On the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction over Serious Criminal
Offenses §§ 5.1(g), 5.2(e), U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (June 6, 2000)
[hereinafter UNTAET] (“‘[C]rimes against humanity’ means [inter alia] . . . [r]ape,
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity”). Cottier argues that the list of
sexual violence crimes
constituted a great advance for the protection of the rights of women in times
of armed conflict. The list reflects a new awareness about the seriousness of
these sexual offences in times of armed conflict and the fact that they
frequently remained unpunished. Delegations at the Rome Conference were
determined to signal to the world that such violence amounts to most serious
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole that must not go
unpunished. The progressive list and definition of the offences relating to
sexual violence is not least the result of sustained lobbying by the women’s
rights movement.
See Cottier, supra note 17, at 431.
120. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 6(d); William A. Schabas, Article 6
Genocide, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 15, at 143, 153 (noting
that the travaux préparatoires of the 1948 Genocide Convention suggested that such
measures to prevent births could include sterilization, compulsory abortion, segregation
of the sexes, and obstacles to marriages). Schabas refers to examples of cases from the
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made by the Trial Chamber of the ICTR in Prosecutor v. Akayesu has
suggested that rapes can be used systematically to change the ethnic
character of the population by impregnating women or by preventing
women from procreating, including where women subsequently refuse to
procreate.121
Articles 6(b) and (c) of the Rome Statute, reflecting the Genocide
Convention, stipulate that both “causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group” and “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”
constitute genocide.122 The Statute defines the crime genocide to include
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,123 and the
Elements of Crimes explicitly stipulate that this may include rape and
sexual violence.124 The ICTY Trial Chamber, in its 1996 decision
Second World War in which individuals were prosecuted for preventing births as a
form of genocide. Id. Specifically, Schabas cites A.G. Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R.
18 (D.C.), 1968, ¶ 244, in which Eichmann was charged for “devising measures the
purpose of which was to prevent child-bearing among Jews by his instruction
forbidding births and for the interruption of pregnancy of Jewish women in the
Theresin Ghetto with intent to exterminate the Jewish people.” Schabas, supra. See
Boot, supra note 15, at 214 (classifying the sexual violence crime of enforced
sterilization as tantamount to the crime of genocide when the crime is committed with
the requisite intent to destroy a particular group in whole or in part because enforced
sterilization “impos[ed] measures intended to prevent births within the group”); Cottier,
supra note 17, at 436 (stating that sexual violence may amount to genocidal acts, in
particular where forced pregnancy, rape, or enforced sterilization qualifies as
“imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group”).
121. See Schabas, supra note 120, at 154 (referring to Prosecutor v. Karadzic &
Mladic, Case Nos. IT-95-18-R61 & IT-95-5-R61, Transcript of Hearing, ¶ 19
(July 2, 1996)). In Karadzic & Mladic, witness Cleirin, a member of the Commission
of Experts, was asked during a hearing of the ICTY whether rape was used
systematically in the former Yuguslavia to change the ethnic character of the
population, by impregnating women. Ms. Cleirin responded, “The Commission did not
have enough information to verify, let us say, these testimonies, who spoke in these
terms. I guess it is possible that both happened.” Id. Similarly, Schabas refers to
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 507 (Sept.
2, 1998), in which the Trial Chamber observed
[i]n patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is determined by the
identity of the father, an example of a measure intended to prevent births
within a group is the case where, during rape, a woman of the said group is
deliberately impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to have her
give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its mother’s group.
Furthermore, the Chamber notes that measures intended to prevent births
within the group may be physical, but can also be mental. For instance, rape
can be a measure intended to prevent births when the person raped refused
subsequently to procreate, in the same way that members of a group can be led,
through threats or trauma, not to procreate.
Id.; see also WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CRIMES OF
CRIMES 172-75 (2009) [hereinafter SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW];
Chinkin, supra note 8, at 122; Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 26-27; Sherrie L.
Russell-Brown, Rape as an Act of Genocide, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 350, 364-65
(2003).
122. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 6(b)-(c).
123. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 6(b).
124. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, art.
6(b) n.3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter Elements of Crimes]
(stating “[t]his conduct may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, acts of torture,
rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment”); Charles Garraway, The
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reviewing the indictment in Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, considered
rape as a possible act of genocide.125 The ICTR, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
stated that the notion of bodily and mental harm as a form of genocide
includes rape and other forms of sexual violence.126 The ICTR found the
accused in Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi guilty of rape as genocide.127 The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has also acknowledged that rape and
other crimes of sexual violence can constitute a form of genocide, namely
causing serious bodily or mental harm.128 Articles 6(b) and (c) form one of
the main bases of the Prosecutor’s request for an arrest warrant against
Sudanese President Al Bashir in the second Darfur case.129
Elements of Genocide: Elements of the Specific Forms of Genocide, in ICC: CRIMES,
PROCEDURE & EVIDENCE, supra note 11, at 41, 50-51 (referring to the discussions that
took place during the Preparatory Commission). Garraway states that footnote 3 is
drawn from Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶ 504 (Sept. 2, 1998), where the ICTR Trial Chamber held that “[t]he Chamber takes
serious bodily or mental harm, without limiting itself thereto, to mean acts of torture,
be they bodily or mental, inhumane or degrading treatment, rape, sexual violence,
persecution.” Garraway, supra; see also Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 25
(observing that the crime of genocide under Article 6 of the Statute does not explicitly
refer to “gender” or “sex” or other identifiable groups but refers to the Akayesu, Case
No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 516, as providing guidance of the intent
of the drafters of the Genocide Convention as being “patently to ensure the protection
of any stable and permanent group”); SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 121, at 170.
125. See Boot, supra note 15, at 215 (referring to Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic,
Case Nos. IT-95-5-R-61 & IT-95-18-R-61, Review of the Indictments Pursuant to Rule
61 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ¶¶ 93-94 (July 11, 1996), in which the Trial
Chamber 1 of the ICTY determined that rape is considered a possible act of genocide).
126. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 731-734.
[T]hey constitute genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they
were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
particular group, targeted as such . . . . These rapes resulted in physical and
psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and their
communities . . . . Sexual violence was a step in the process of destruction of
the [T]utsi group—destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself.
Id. The Trial Chamber found that the acts described were acts enumerated in Article
2(2) of the ICTR Statute, supra note 61, which used the 1948 Genocide Convention
definition of genocide, and that the acts were committed with the requisite intent. Id.
See also Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 25-27.
127. See Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, ¶¶ 291-293 (June 17, 2004); MacKinnon, supra note 76, at 213.
128. See Schabas, supra note 120, at 152-53 (describing a case concerning
application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Serbia & Montenegro, Preliminary Exceptions,
¶ 319, 2007 I.C.J. 1 (Feb. 26)). However, the ICJ found on the facts in the case that it
had not been established conclusively that the atrocities were committed with the
requisite specific intent to destroy the group in whole or in part. Id.; see also Askin,
supra note 106, at 1016.
129. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09 (Mar. 4, 2009). In its
application for Al Bashir’s warrant for arrest, the OTP claimed:
Al Bashir’s forces and agents subjected those approximately 2.5 million
living in IDP [internally displaced persons] camps, including a substantial part
of the target groups, to serious bodily and mental harm through rape and other
forms of sexual violence against thousands of women in the camps. Rapes are
under-reported. They are used as a weapon, a silent weapon, to destroy the
target groups in and around the IDP camps.
Militia/Janjaweed, which Al Bashir has recruited, armed, and
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The following sexual violence offenses130 are explicitly proscribed as
crimes against humanity131 and as war crimes in the context of both

purposefully failed to disarm, are stationed in the vicinity of the camps.
Periodic reports and testimonies conclude that rape has been committed
systematically and continuously for 5 years. Women and girls going to collect
firewood, grass or water are repeatedly raped by Militia/Janjaweed, Armed
Forces and other GoS security agents: “when we see them, we run. Some of us
succeed in getting away, and some are caught and taken to be raped—gangraped. Maybe around 20 men rape one woman . . . . These things are normal
for us here in Darfur. These things happen all the time. I have seen rapes too.
It does not matter who sees them raping the women—they don't care. They
rape women in front of their mothers and fathers.”
Between March and October 2005, a health specialist treated at least 28
victims of rape and sexual trauma in IDP camps in Darfur. She told the
Prosecution that most of the victims exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic
stress disorder, including extreme shame, grief, hopelessness, anger and rage,
flashbacks, nightmares, and inability to interpret their environment. The
witness noted that many of the girls who had been raped when they went to get
firewood outside IDP camps were repeatedly re-traumatised because they had
no choice but to revisit the places where they had been raped. She recalled the
situation of an 18-year-old girl in one of the camps. As explained by the girl’s
sister, their village had been attacked and bombed by an airplane. The girl was
raped, beaten, and left to die. Members of the community eventually found
her, but from that day she had not spoken. The girl was psychotic from her
trauma and displayed no initiative. She was robotic and had to be told to dress
and eat.
Babies born as a result of these assaults have been termed “Janjaweed
babies” and are rarely accepted as members of the community. The high
number of such unwanted babies has led to an explosion of infanticides and
abandonment of babies in Darfur. As one victim explained: “they kill our
males and dilute our blood with rape. [They] . . . want to finish us as a people,
end our history.”
The mental harm caused by rape has been compounded by the impunity
afforded to the perpetrators. As depicted by one victim: “those who rape you
wear fatigues and those who protect you wear fatigues. We don’t know any
more who to run from and who to run to.”
Rape is an integral part of the pattern of destruction that Al Bashir is
inflicting upon the target groups in Darfur. As described by the ICTR in the
Akayesu case, rape is used to “kill the will, the spirit, and life itself.”
Particularly in view of the social stigma associated with rape and other forms
of sexual violence among the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa, these acts caused
significant and irreversible harm, to individual women, and also to their
communities.
....
In accordance with established jurisprudence, the magnitude of the rapes
and sexual assaults carried out by forces and agents under the control of Al
Bashir during attacks on villages and around IDP settlements and camps,
indicates an intent to destroy the target groups as such.
See Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Case No. ICC-02/05-157-Annex A, Public Redacted
Version of the Prosecutor’s Application Under Article 58, ¶¶ 23-28, 56 (July 14, 2008).
130. See Boot, supra note 15, at 206-16; see also Kelly D. Askin, Crimes Within the
Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 10 CRIM. L. F. 33, 41 (1999)
(observing that “most sexual and gender-based crimes are explicitly prohibited and
codified as crimes against humanity under the ICC Statute, while other crimes,
particularly crimes of sexualized violence, have been implicitly prohibited as clearly
contrary to international law”).
131. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(g). See Boot, supra note 15, at 20608 (emphasizing that the list of sexual violence offenses as crimes against humanity
refers to “any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity”).
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international132 and non-international armed conflicts.133
Rape: The Rome Statute was the first international instrument of an
international criminal court to explicitly proscribe the crime of rape as both
a war crime134 and a crime against humanity, within the same instrument.
Nevertheless, it is arguable that the customary international law status of
rape as an international crime is evidenced by a number of international
conventions and the practice of punishing rape as an international crime.135
Rape had been proscribed as a war crime in various international (and
national) instruments prior to the Second World War.136 Rape and other
132. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(xxii). See Cottier, supra note 17,
at 431-54 (noting that article 8(2)(b)(xxii) of the Rome Statute list of sexual violence
offenses as war crimes in an international armed conflict includes “any other form of
sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions”)
(emphasis added).
133. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(e)(vi). See Andreas Zimmerman,
Article 8(2)(c)-(f) and para. 3: War Crimes Committed in an Armed Conflict Not of an
International Character, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 15, at
475, 495-96 (noting that the list of sexual violence offenses as war crimes in a noninternational armed conflict within Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute refers to
“any other form of sexual violence also constituting a serious violation of article 3
common to the four Geneva Conventions”).
134. See Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 22.
[W]hilst the grave breach provisions of the ICC Statute do not contain an
explicit reference to sexual violence crimes as their language is imported from
the Geneva Conventions, that the explicit enumeration of the sexual violence
crimes at article 8(2)(b)(xxii) and reference to any other form of sexual
violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions is a major
accomplishment in that it clearly acknowledges that sexual violence is
subsumed within the grave breach provisions.
Id.
135. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 349-50; see also KRIANGSAK
KITTICHAISAREE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 45 (2001); Koenig & Askin, supra
note 10, at 9 (arguing that in 1999, rape was likely among the crimes considered to be
subject to universal jurisdiction); Meron, supra note 36, at 425 (observing that rape was
prohibited by law of war for centuries); David S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in
International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 219, 225 (2005).
136. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 347-48 (noting that “[t]he Declaration of
Brussels in 1874 attempted to codify the laws of war on an international level and
protected a woman’s right to ‘dignity and honour’”). This was codified in the 1907
Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land article 46, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3) 461, reprinted in 2 AM. J. INT’L
L. 90 (1908) [hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention IV], which called for armies to
respect “family honour and rights,” which was generally understood to encompass
rape. Id. at 348; see also Boot, supra note 15, at 206-07 & nn.206, 216 & 218
(observing that the crime of rape had been prohibited as a war crime in various national
and international instruments before the Second World War; including the prohibition
of rape as a violation of the laws of war in the 1863 Lieber Code). FRANCIS LIEBER,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD
(LEIBER CODE) art. XLIV (1863), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_
century/lieber.asp (stating that “[a]ll wanton violence . . . all rape, wounding, maiming
or killing . . . [is] prohibited under penalty of death, or other such severe punishment as
may be seen adequate”). The Lieber Code contained one of the first explicit
prohibitions against rape, and although this was a national military code promulgated
during the American Civil War, it was subsequently replicated by other nations’
militaries. Furthermore, the rape and abduction of girls and women for the purpose of
enforced prostitution was expressly recognized as a violation of the laws of humanity
under the 1919 Paris Peace Conference Commission Report. See Koenig & Askin,
supra note 10, at 6 (observing that customary law acknowledging that rape is a war
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sexual offenses, however, were usually not explicitly listed as war crimes,
but instead were covered indirectly as attacks on honor rather than physical
crimes.137 Rape was first explicitly recognized as a violation of the “laws
of humanity” in the 1919 Peace Conference Commission Report.138 Rape
was not explicitly included in the definitions of crimes in the Nuremberg
Charter, the Nuremberg Principles, or the Tokyo Charter, but was
prosecuted under the terms other inhumane acts, ill-treatment, and failure
to respect family honor and rights.139 Rape was also explicitly defined as a
crime against humanity, but not as a war crime under Allied Control
Council Law No. 10.140 Although rape was not explicitly included as a
grave breach or violation of Common Article 3 of the four Geneva
crime dates back at least to the fifteenth century); Kuo, supra note 51, at 306; Meron,
supra note 36, at 427-28; Spees, supra note 108, at 21-22.
137. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the
Armed Forces at Sea art. 51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War arts. 14, 130, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 27, 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention IV]; see also ASKIN, supra note 8, at 51 n.180 (observing that rape
was often treated like property crimes or crimes against a man’s honor); Boot, supra
note 15, at 206-07 & nn.217, 223 (commenting that other crimes of sexual violence
were often included only “in an elliptical fashion and categorised as attacks on honour
rather than as crimes of sexual violence against personal autonomy of the victim”).
Boot cites as an example of these “elliptical” references The Declaration of Brussels of
1874, article XXXVII (“[t]he honour and rights of the family . . . should be respected”).
The 1907 Hague Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV included crimes of
sexual violence implicitly by expressing that “[f]amily honour and rights, the lives of
persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice must be
respected”; 1907 Hague Convention IV, supra note 136, art. 46. Boot, supra note 15, at
206 n.217. Boot observes that rape was not expressly included as a grave breach or
violation of common article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Boot further
observes that the two Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 include
prohibitions on rape and other crimes of sexual violence in international and national
armed conflict, but continued to treat them as attacks on honor and dignity. This
included “outrages upon personal dignity, enforced prostitution and any form of
indecent assault.” Id. at 207 & n.223. Boot notes that the only indirect reference to
rape and other sexual offences is in Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which
is not a grave breach provision, states that women shall be protected against “any attack
on their honour, in particular, rape, enforced prostitution or any other form of sexual
assault.” Id. at 207. See also Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 10 (arguing that the
“terminology is hampered by the possible harm caused by association or equation of
crimes of sexual violence with crimes against honor or outrages upon one’s dignity”).
“The ICC Statute makes great progress in delinking language applied to sexual
violence from language concerning crimes against honor or dignity. The terminology
demonstrates the crucial need to redress the discriminatory and patriarchal language of
many international instruments, which are overwhelmingly lacking in gendersensitivity or gender-awareness.” Id. at 11; Meron, supra note 36, at 427.
138. See Boot, supra note 15, at 167, 206-07 & nn.5, 217-18 (citing to the
Commission of the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (1919 Peace
Conference Commission Report), Versailles, March 1919, Conference of Paris,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, Pamphlet
No. 32, Annex, p. 214).
139. See Boot, supra note 15, at 207; see also Cottier, supra note 17, at 433.
140. See Boot, supra note 15, at 207; see also La Haye, supra note 11, at 187.
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Conventions of 1949, the ICTY and ICTR found rape was covered under
these provisions as torture, an inhumane act, inhuman or cruel treatment,
wilfully causing great suffering or injury, or an outrage upon personal
dignity.141 There is an explicit reference in Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, but this is not a grave breach provision. Article 27 calls for
protection of women against sexual violence, including rape, in terms of an
attack on a woman’s honor.142 The two Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions of 1977 do include prohibitions on rape and other sexual
violence crimes during international and non-international armed conflicts,
again, treating them as attacks on honor and dignity.143 Article 5(g) of the
ICTY statute and Article 3(g) of the ICTR statute expressly include rape as
a crime against humanity, but none of the sexual crimes are explicitly listed
as war crimes in their own right.144 Article 4(e) of the ICTR statute refers
to “rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault” as types of
outrages upon personal dignity or violations of Common Article 3 to the
Geneva Conventions.145 There is no explicit reference to other crimes of
sexual violence. However rape and other sexual violence crimes have been
prosecuted before the ICTY and ICTR as war crimes under other
provisions of these statutes, including as grave breaches and violations of
Common Article 3.146
Sexual slavery: The Rome Statute provided the first explicit prohibition
by an international criminal court on sexual slavery. Although sexual
141. See Boot, supra note 15, at 207 & n.223. Boot observes that rape was not
expressly included as a grave breach or violation of common article 3 of the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949. See Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 10; La Haye,
supra note 11, at 187 (referring to the Prosecutor v. Delalic et al, Case No. IT-96-21,
Trial Chambers Judgment, ¶¶ 476-477 (Nov. 16, 1998) (Celibici trial), where the ICTY
stated that “there can be no doubt that rape and other forms of sexual assault are
expressly prohibited under international humanitarian law . . . . However, the relevant
provisions do not define rape.”).
142. See Boot, supra note 15, at 207. Boot notes that the only indirect reference to
rape and other sexual offences is in Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which
is not a grave breach provision, and states that women shall be protected against “any
attack on their honour, in particular, rape, enforced prostitution or any other form of
sexual assault.”
143. See Boot, supra note 15, at 207 & n.223 (citing the Additional Protocol I,
Article 75(2)(b) (prohibiting at all times outrages upon personal dignity, enforced
prostitution, and any form of indecent assault), Article 76 (claiming special protection
of women from rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault),
neither of which are grave breach provisions. Additional Protocol II, Article 4(2)(e)
(outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, rape, enforced prostitution or any other
form of indecent assault), which extends protections of common article 3 to the Geneva
Conventions). See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, Relating to the Victims of International Armed Conflicts arts. 75(2)(b) & 76,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 4(2)(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[Additional Protocol II]; La Haye, supra note 11, at 187; Sellers, supra note 63, at 29899.
144. See ICTY Statute, supra note 61, art. 5(g); see also ICTR Statute, supra note
66, art. 3(g).
145. ICTR Statute, supra note 61, art. 4(e).
146. Boot, supra note 15, at 208.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2009

29

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 6

slavery had not been explicitly defined under international humanitarian
law or other international law treaties in those terms, it is considered to
have been prohibited as a particular form of enslavement, the prohibition of
which is considered a jus cogens norm in customary international law.147
Antonio Cassese noted that the crime of sexual slavery was prohibited
under customary international law.148 Prior to the Statute, the slavery of
women, including in the form of trafficking, was also explicitly prohibited
by various international instruments.149
Enforced prostitution: The Rome Statute provides the first explicit
prohibition by an international criminal court on enforced prostitution as
both a war crime and crime against humanity. Abduction of females for
the purpose of enforced prostitution was expressly recognized as a
violation of the laws of humanity by the 1919 Peace Conference
Commission Report.150 Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention,
which is not a grave breach provision, also referred to the need for women
to be protected against attacks on the woman’s honor, such as enforced
prostitution.151 The crime was also punishable, for instance, under
147. See Boot, supra note 15, at 211 (referring to the 1919 Peace Conference
Commission Report); see also Cottier, supra note 17, at 441-42 (observing that “sexual
slavery” was not defined under international humanitarian law treaties or other
international conventions, whilst the more generic concept of “slavery” has been
defined in various conventions and is considered a jus cogens norm in customary
international law). The war crime of sexual slavery can be regarded as a particular
form of slavery. Id.
148. See Antonio Cassese, Crimes Against Humanity, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 353, 374-75 (Antonio Cassese et
al. eds., 2002)) (observing that according to the Furundzija Trial Chamber Judgment,
various forms of sexual violence are criminalized by international law, including sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization, and “any other form of sexual
violence of comparable gravity”); see also Cottier, supra note 17, at 441 n.837 (citing
the 1998 U.N. Slavery Rapporteur Report, ¶ 28 and Update to the 1998 UN Slavery
Rapporteur Report, Annex ¶¶ 9, 12, 51 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/21
(Jun. 6, 2000)) (qualifying sexual slavery “as an international crime and a violation of
jus cogens norms in the exact same manner as slavery”); Valerie Oosterveld, Sexual
Slavery and the International Criminal Court: Advancing International Law, 25 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 605, 608 (2004).
149. See Cottier, supra note 17, at 441 & nn.839, 842. Cottier refers to “new” forms
of slavery such as the use of “comfort women stations” by the Japanese during World
War II, the use of slave labor by Nazi Germany, and “instances of slavery and sexual
slavery” in the “rape camps” in former Yugoslavia, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case
No. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 515-543, 728-744,
(Feb. 22, 2001), and the Rwanda and Liberia conflicts, U.N. Slavery Special
Rapporteur Report, supra note 59, ¶ 30. International instruments evolved to address
these particular forms of slavery, such as the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery
of 7 September 1956; Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (prohibiting slavery, slave-trade, servitude, and forced or compulsory labor);
Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights (prohibiting slavery, servitude,
forced or compulsory labour); and Article 6 of the African Charter of Human Rights
(prohibiting slavery, involuntary servitude, slave trade, traffic in women, and forced or
compulsory labor).
150. See Boot, supra note 15, at 206-07 n.218 (citing to the 1919 Peace Conference
Commission Report).
151. See id. at 207; see also La Haye, supra note 11, at 192 (highlighting that
“enforced prostitution appears in article 27(2) of Geneva Convention IV” as an attack
upon personal dignity and causing “humiliating and degrading treatment”).
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Australian and Chinese war crimes laws of 1945 and 1946.152 The two
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 also referred to
prohibitions on enforced prostitution.153 Boot observes that the 1996 Draft
Statute of the International Law Commission was the first instrument to
expressly include enforced prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse in
addition to rape as crimes against humanity.154 Enforced prostitution has
been described as being a form of sexual slavery or enslavement,155 which
as explained in a later section, was one of the first crimes prohibited under
international law.
Forced pregnancy: This offense was referred to in a number of
international declarations and resolutions.156 As described above, forcible
impregnation when used to change the ethnic composition of a group has
been previously found to constitute a form of genocide.157 The Statute,
however, provides the first explicit prohibition on forced pregnancy as a
war crime and crime against humanity in an international instrument.158
Enforced sterilization: Enforced sterilization was prosecuted at

152. See Cottier, supra note 17, at 447 n.882 (citing to the Commonwealth of
Australia War Crimes Act of 1945, V LAW REPORTS 94-95 (1948), and Chinese Law
Governing the Trial of War Criminals of 24 October 1946, 14 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS 154 (1949)) (determining that under Australian and Chinese law
the abduction of women and girls for the purpose of prostitution was defined as a
crime).
153. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 143, art. 75(2)(b) (including “outrages
upon personal dignity, enforced prostitution, and any form of indecent assault”); id. art.
76 (criminalizing “rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault”);
Additional Protocol II, supra note 143, art. 4(2)(e) (criminalizing “rape, enforced
prostitution or any other form of indecent assault”); see also Boot, supra note 15, at
207 n.223.
154. Boot, supra note 15, at 208.
155. See U.N. Slavery Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 59, ¶ 32; Boot, supra
note 15, at 212 & n.244 (referring to the argument made by the U.N. Slavery Special
Rapporteur “that sexual slavery encompasses most, if not all form of ‘forced
prostitution,’ which ‘generally refers to conditions of control over a person who is
coerced by another to engage in sexual activity’”). The U.N. Slavery Special
Rapporteur observes “that older definitions of enforced prostitution are nearly
indistinct from definitions that more accurately describe the condition of slavery.” See
also Boot, supra note 15 at 214; see also Cassese, supra note 148, at 374-75 (referring
to the Furundzija Trial Chamber Judgment, the author observes that various forms of
sexual violence are criminalized by international law, including sexual slavery,
enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity); Oosterveld, supra note 148, at 621 (observing that the argument
to retain the crime of enforced prostitution, in spite of being covered by sexual slavery
in most cases, covers situations involving “less than slave-like conditions”).
156. See Machteld Boot, Crimes Against Humanity, Article 7(2)(f): Forced
Pregnancy, in COMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 15, at 255 n.488 (citing
to the Vienna Declaration, World Conference on Human Rights ¶¶ 18, 38, June 1425, 1993, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24, and The Elimination of Violence Against
Women, U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 1998/52 ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/52
(1998)); see also Cottier, supra note 17, at 448-50.
157. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶ 507 (Sept. 2, 1998) (describing how forcible pregnancy could constitute genocide in
particular patriarchal societies where a woman is deliberately impregnated by a man of
another group with the intent to give birth to a child who will consequently not be
accepted as belonging to its mother’s group).
158. See Chinkin, supra note 8, at 121-22; Cottier, supra note 17, at 448.

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2009

31

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 6

Nuremberg under Allied Control Council Law 10, as both a war crime and
a crime against humanity.159 Enforced sterilization may also constitute
genocide, where it is committed with the intent to destroy a particular
group in whole or in part. This form of genocide has been dealt with under
the crime of imposing measures intended to prevent births within the
group.160 The Rome Statute provides the first explicit prohibition of
enforced sterilization as both a war crime and crime against humanity by an
international court.
Any other form of sexual violence: The first international instrument to
explicitly refer to protections against “any form of sexual assault” was
Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.161 The two Additional
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1977 both refer to prohibitions on
“any other form of indecent assault.”162 Article 4(2) of the ICTY Statute
also prohibited outrages upon personal dignity including “any form of
indecent assault.”163 The ICTY Trial Chamber in Delalic stated that rape
“and other forms of sexual assault are expressly prohibited under
international humanitarian law.”164 Similarly, the ICTY Trial Chamber in
Furundzija held that “international criminal rules punish not only rape but
also any serious sexual assault falling short of actual penetration.”165
The crime against humanity of gender persecution:166 Persecution has
been included as a crime against humanity in previous international
instruments including the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, Allied Control
Council Law No. 10 and the Nuremberg Principles.167 It was also

159. See Boot, supra note 15, at 214 n.255 (noting that in the “Medical Case,”
several defendants were found guilty of having committed war crimes and crimes
against humanity involving different kinds of medical experiments, including under
sterilization experiments); see also U.S. v. Brandt (1946), in 1-2 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NEURNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
LAW NO. 10, supra note 56.
160. See Boot, supra note 15, at 214.
161. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 137, at 27.
162. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 143, arts. 75(2)(b), 76; Additional
Protocol II, supra note 143, art. 4(2)(e)); see also Boot, supra note 15, at 207 n.223; La
Haye, supra note 11, at 197.
163. ICTY Statute, supra note 61, art. 4(2).
164. La Haye, supra note 11, at 187.
165. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/I-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶ 186 (Dec. 10, 1998); see also Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 476 (Nov. 16, 1998); Cottier, supra note 17, at 452; Koenig &
Askin, supra note 10, at 24-25; La Haye, supra note 11, at 197 & n.144 (referencing
the Furundzija Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 186, where the ICTY found that “sexual
assault” should “embrace all serious abuses of a sexual nature inflicted upon the
physical and moral integrity of a person by means of coercion, threat of force or
intimidation in a way that is degrading and humiliating for the victim’s dignity”).
166. See Boot, supra note 15, at 216 (noting that Article 7(1)(h) of the Rome
Statute, supra note 1, states that “[p]ersecution against any identifiable group or
collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in
paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court”) (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 216.
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explicitly included in the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR as a crime against
humanity.168 The ICTY and ICTR have accepted that “serious bodily and
mental harm and infringements upon freedom” are included in the crime of
persecution.169 The ICTY has determined that the crime of persecution
includes rape170 and sexual assaults.171 Moreover, crimes previously
recognized to constitute persecution include crimes that can encompass
sexual violence and gender-based crimes. For instance, the ICTY has
determined that the crime of persecution includes enslavement,172 torture,173
physical violence not constituting torture,174 cruel and inhumane treatment
or subjection to inhumane conditions,175 constant humiliation and
degradation,176 unlawful arrest, detention, imprisonment or confinement of
civilians,177 forced labor,178 and deliberate attacks on civilians and
168. See id. at 216 n.270 (citing ICTY Statute, supra note 61, art. 5(h), and ICTR
Statute, supra note 61, art. 3(h), as both recognizing the crime of persecution in the list
of crimes against humanity).
169. Id. at 258-59.
170. See id. (referencing, in particular, Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-A,
Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 105-109 (Mar. 22, 2006); Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case
No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 754-757 (July 31, 2003) (conviction of
persecution for rape); Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Trial Chamber
Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 119 (Dec. 18, 2003) (conviction of persecution for aiding and
abetting rape)).
171. See Sellers, supra note 39, at 186 (highlighting that the Krstic Trial Chamber
Judgment had condemned sexual assaults as persecutory acts).
172. See Boot, supra note 156, at 259 n.518 (citing Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No.
IT-95-14, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 224 (Mar. 3, 2000)); International Military
Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 245-46, 249
(1947) (finding the use of slave laborers, including in concentration camps, to be a
form of persecution). See generally Att’y Gen. v. Eichmann, Supreme Court of Israel,
36 I.L.R. 277 (1968).
173. See Boot, supra note 156, at 258-59 n.523 (referring to the Nuremberg
Judgment for the proposition that “beating and torture” amount to persecution; the
Stakic Appeals Chamber Judgment, in which the court upheld the persecution
conviction for torture; the Blaskic Appeals Chamber Judgment; and the Blaskic Trial
Chamber Judgment).
174. See id. at 258-59 n.525 (including “‘serious bodily and mental harm’ and other
serious acts on the person such as those presently enumerated in Article 5 of the ICTY
Statute”). Boot also refers to Stakic Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 105-109
(“upholding [a] persecution conviction for physical violence”); Blaskic Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 143 (stating that “[i]t is clear in the jurisprudence of the
International Tribunal that acts of serious bodily and mental harm are of sufficient
gravity as compared to the other crimes enumerated in Article 5 of the Statute and
therefore may constitute persecutions”); Stakic Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 753; Simic
Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 234. Boot, supra note 15, at 258-59 n. 525.
175. See Boot, supra note 156, at 260 n.526 (noting examples, such as the Nikolic
Trial Chamber Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 119, where the court handed down a conviction
of persecution for subjecting victims to inhumane conditions, and the Blagojevic Trial
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 620, finding that cruel and inhumane treatment constitutes
persecution).
176. See id. at 260 n.527 (“subjecting detainees to ‘physical or psychological abuse
and intimidation’” (citing the Blaskic Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 155)). Boot also
cites to the Stakic Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 105-109, and to the Stakic Trial
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 760. Boot, supra.
177. See Boot, supra note 156, at 260 n.529 (citing examples to the Nuremberg
Judgment (the arrest of prominent Jewish businessmen); the Simic Appeals Chamber
Judgment, ¶¶ 106-118 (upholding the conviction for persecution based on unlawful
arrests and detention); and the Blaskic Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 234 (finding that the
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indiscriminate attacks on undefended civilian localities.179 Accordingly,
The Rome Statute provides the first explicit reference to the ground of
gender in a statute of an international criminal court.180
The crime against humanity of enslavement: The Statute also prohibits
the crime against humanity of enslavement, which is stated under the
Statute and the Elements of Crimes to include the exercise of power of
ownership over a person in the course of “trafficking of persons, in
particular women and children.”181 Slavery was one of the first recognized
crimes under international law and was covered by the 1926 Slavery
Convention,182 which has been stated to cover slavery-like practices such as
trafficking women.183
Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter and
Article 5(c) of the Tokyo Charter included enslavement as a crime against
humanity, and deportation to forced labor as a war crime.184 Slavery has
been prohibited under international human rights and humanitarian law,
unlawful detention of civilians as a form of persecution means unlawfully depriving a
group of discriminated civilians of their freedom)).
178. See Boot, supra note 156, at 260 n.533 (referencing the Simic Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 139-159, upholding the conviction of persecution for forced
labor).
179. See id. at 260 n.528 (“unlawful attack[s] launched deliberately against civilians
or civilian objects may constitute a crime of persecution” (citing examples from the
Kordic Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 105)). Boot also cites to the Blaskic Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 159, stating that “attacks in which civilians are targeted, as well
as indiscriminate attacks on cities, towns, and villages, may constitute persecutions as a
crime against humanity.” Id.
180. See id. at 220.
[P]ersecution on gender grounds as the term is generally understood in other
international instruments and UN usage may fall within the jurisdiction of the
Court to the extent that such discrimination would be based on one of the
“other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law” . . . or involved “other inhumane acts” . . . .
Id.
181. See Elements of Crimes, supra note 124, art. 7(1)(g)-2 & n.18,
art. 8(2)(b)(xxii)-2 & n.53, art. 8(2)(e)(vi)-2 & n.65. Article 7(2)(c) of the Rome
Statute, supra note 1, defines enslavement for the purpose of article 7(1)(c) as “the
exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person
and includes the exercise of such power in the court of trafficking in persons, in
particular women and children.” See Hall, supra note 77, at 193-94 (remarking that the
Court’s jurisdiction is not limited to the practice of traditional forms of slavery); Darryl
Robinson, The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, in ICC: CRIMES, PROCEDURE &
EVIDENCE, supra note 11, at 57, 84-85 (noting the additional language regarding
trafficking, in particular women and children, proposed by Italy, and observing that
“[t]his language highlights one of the most persistent forms of enslavement today”).
Robinson also notes that the formulation for the material element for the crime against
humanity of enslavement was drawn from the war crime of sexual slavery, which had
previously been negotiated. Id.
182. See Hall, supra note 77, at 191; see also Robinson, supra note 181, at 85
(defining the term “servile status” as “clarified by reference to its origin, the 1956
Supplementary Slavery Convention, which at articles 1 and 7, includes forced
marriage, child exploitation, debt bondage and serfdom”).
183. See Hall, supra note 77, at 193; see also Robinson, supra note 181, at 85
(outlining the discussions at the Preparatory Commission, and saying that “similar
deprivation of liberty” was intended to expressly capture a multitude of situations that
can amount to enslavement including trafficking, exacting forced labor, and reducing a
person to a servile status).
184. See Hall, supra note 77, at 192; see also Cottier, supra note 17, at 441.
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including under Article 4(2)(f) of the second Additional Protocol of 1977 to
the Geneva Conventions.185 It has been explicitly recognized as a crime
against humanity in subsequent instruments, including the statutes of the
ICTY and ICTR.186 As described previously, the ICTY in Prosecutor v.
Kunarac found that various forms of sexual violence constitute
enslavement.187
b. Other Crimes that Also Cover Prohibitions on Sexual Violence
In addition, the ad hoc international criminal tribunals have held that
other offenses also included in the Rome Statute include prohibitions
against sexual violence, such as rape, particularly, the following offenses
enumerated under the Statute.
First, rape, as previously described, constitutes genocide in certain cases.
Second, rape has also been held to be a form of torture.188 The ICTR in
Prosecutor v. Akayesu and the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Delalic et al. (the
Celebici case),189 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, and Prosecutor v. Kunarac,190
185. See Additional Protocol II, supra note 143, art. 4(2)(e)-(f) (prohibiting “slavery
and the slave trade in all their forms” in non-international armed conflict); see also
Hall, supra note 77, at 192 (describing examples of international human rights
instruments prohibiting slavery, including the Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery,
entered into force Apr. 30, 1957, 226 U.N.T.S. 3, and general human rights
instruments, such as International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 8, entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171).
186. See Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, supra note 119, art. 5;
see also Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 119, art. 2(c);
UNTAET, supra note 119, ¶¶ 5.1(c), 5.2(b); ICTR Statute, supra note 61, art. 3(c);
ICTY Statute, supra note 61, art. 5(c); Hall, supra note 77, at 193.
187. See Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial
Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 515-43 (Feb. 22, 2001); see also Chinkin, supra note 8, at 123,
127-28.
188. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(f) (torture as a crime against
humanity), art. 8(2)(a)(ii) (torture as a grave breach of the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions in situations of international armed conflict), art. 8(2)(c)(i) (torture as a
violation of article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions in situations of
non-international armed conflict); see also Boot, supra note 15, at 215 (stating that rape
can be considered as constituting torture); Cottier, supra note 17, at 434-36 (indicating
that in the 1990s, it became increasingly recognized that rape and other forms of sexual
violence amounted to war crimes and grave breaches such as torture as well as inhuman
treatment and willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health).
Cottier also observes that the war crime of sexual violence may also qualify as the
general forms of mistreatment such as torture or inhuman treatment, willfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health, or outrages upon personal dignity.
Id.; Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 22 n.82; Zimmermann, supra note 133, at 490.
189. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶¶ 480-496 (Nov. 16, 1998) (noting that rape and other forms of sexual violence and
other acts constitute torture when fulfilling other requirements of torture). The Delalic
Trial Chamber also stated that it was difficult to envision circumstances where rape by
or at the instigation of a public official, or with the consent or acquiescence of an
official, does not involve punishment, coercion, intimidation, or discrimination and that
this is inherent in situations of armed conflict. Id.; see also Boot, supra note 15, at 215
(referring to the Akayesu Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 597, as stating that “[l]ike torture,
rape is a violation of personal dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity”); Zimmermann, supra note 133, at 490 &
n.1105.
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held that rape can constitute a form of torture.
Third, forms of sexual violence have been found to constitute inhumane
acts.191 The ICTR and ICTY have held that “other inhumane acts”
constituting crimes against humanity, include: enforced prostitution,192
other acts of sexual violence193 (including acts of violence to, and
mutilation of, a dead body causing mental suffering to eye-witnesses194 ),
and inhumane acts of sexual mutilation and other forms of sexual violence
committed against prisoners.195 Rape and other forms of sexual violence
have also been held to constitute inhuman treatment as a grave breach, or
cruel treatment as violation of the laws or customs of war under Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.196
190. See Kunarac et al., Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, ¶ 294; see also Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 18-19; Sellers, supra note
63, at 295 (observing that sexual violence has been held to satisfy elements of torture in
several cases including under the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights). See generally Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, Case. No. IT-95-17/I-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment (July 21, 2000);
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case. No. IT-95-17/IT, Trial Chamber Judgment (Dec. 10,
1998).
191. See Machteld Boot, Crimes Against Humanity, Article 7(1)(k): Other Inhumane
Acts, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 15, at 231 (“[o]ther
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious
injury to body or to mental or physical health” (citing Rome Statute, supra note 1, art.
7(1)(k)); see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 353-54.
192. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶ 566 (Feb. 21, 2001); see also Boot, supra note 191, at 231.
193. See Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 916 (Dec. 1, 2003) (stating that “[o]ther acts of sexual
violence which may fall outside of this specific definition [of rape] may of course be
prosecuted . . . as other inhumane acts”) (emphasis added); see also Boot, supra note
191, at 231.
194. See Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-T, Trial Chamber Judgment and
Sentence, ¶ 936; see also Boot, supra note 191, at 231.
195. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 198,
206 (May 7, 1997) (describing sexual mutilation and other forms of sexual violence
committed against male prisoners, including an incident where two prisoners were
forced to commit oral sexual acts on another prisoner and then were forced to bite off
one of that prisoner’s testicles); Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 21 (referring to
various forms of sexual violence charged as crimes against humanity in ICTY
indictments constituting “inhumane acts”).
196. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 8(2)(a)(ii) (including inhuman treatment,
which is one of the grave breaches of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions in an
international armed conflict), 8(2)(c)(i) (including cruel treatment, which is one of the
violations of art. 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions in situations of noninternational armed conflicts); BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 359-60; Chinkin, supra
note 8, at 123 n.59 (referring to Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial
Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 692, 695, 700 (Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No.
IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 1066 (Nov. 16, 1998); Tadic, Case No. IT-941-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 724-726). See also Cottier, supra note 17, at 432,
434, 435 (observing that rape and other forms of sexual violence were not previously
explicitly articulated as such and often subsumed under general forms of mistreatment
such as inhuman and degrading treatment). Cottier also states that in the 1990s, it
became increasingly recognized that rape and other forms of sexual violence amounted
to war crimes and grave breaches such as inhuman treatment, torture, and willfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health. Id. Cottier further noted
that the war crime of sexual violence may also qualify as a general form of
mistreatment such as torture, inhuman treatment, willfully causing great suffering, or
serious injury to body or health or outrages upon personal dignity. Id. Koenig &
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Fourth, rape and other forms of sexual violence have also been held to
constitute a form of grave breach of the four Geneva Conventions of
“wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.”197
Cottier argues it may also be encompassed by the grave breach of
wounding a person hors de combat.198
Fifth, rape and other forms of sexual violence have also been held to
constitute outrages upon personal dignity.199 Article 27 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention and Article 4(2) of Additional Protocol II of 1977 to
the Geneva Conventions (which is said to reinforce and supplement
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949) explicitly state that
outrages upon personal dignity include rape, enforced prostitution,
humiliating and degrading treatment, and “any form of indecent assault.”200
Article 75(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions also
refers to enforced prostitution, humiliating and degrading treatment, and
any form of indecent assault.201 Article 4(e) of the ICTR Statute explicitly
describe outrages upon personal dignity as including rape, enforced

Askin, supra note 10, at 22-24 & nn.82-84, 88-91 (referring to charges brought before
the ICTY for rape as “inhuman treatment” (grave breach), and referencing indictments
brought for charges for sexual violence as grave breaches, as constituting torture,
inhuman treatment, and wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or
health). Koenig and Askin also reference indictments brought for charges for sexual
violence as violation of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, as constituting
cruel treatment, torture, humiliating and degrading treatment, and outrages upon
personal dignity. Koenig & Askin, supra.
197. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(a)(iii); see Cottier, supra note 17, at 43236, 452 (stating that rape and other forms of sexual violence were often subsumed
under general forms of mistreatment including “wilfully causing great suffering or
serious injury to body or health”). Cottier also notes, however, that in the 1990s it
became increasingly recognized that rape and other forms of sexual violence amounted
to war crimes and grave breaches such as willfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health (and torture and inhuman treatment). Id. Cottier also observes
that although the ICTR and ICTY statutes did not explicitly provide that forms of
sexual violence are war crimes, the ICTY and ICTR have prosecuted rape and other
forms of sexual violence as grave breaches or serious violations of the laws and
customs of war. Id. Furthermore, Cottier observes that the war crime of sexual
violence may also qualify as general forms of mistreatment, such as willfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health, torture, inhuman treatment, or
outrages upon personal dignity. Id. See also BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 353-54;
Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 22 n.84.
198. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(vi); see Cottier, supra note 17, at 436.
199. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(xxi) (applying to situations of
international armed conflict); id. art. 8(2)(c) (applying to situations of non-international
armed conflict); Int’l Criminal Court, Report of the Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(b)(xxi), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2
(Nov. 2, 2000) [hereinafter ICC, Report of the Preparatory Commission] (defining this
crime as situations where the “perpetrator humiliated, degraded or otherwise violated
the dignity of one or more persons”; and “[t]he severity of the humiliation, degradation
or other violation was of such degree to be generally recognized as an outrage upon
personal dignity”). Id.; Cottier, supra note 17, at 435 (observing that the war crime of
sexual violence may also qualify as the general forms of mistreatment such as outrages
upon personal dignity, torture, inhuman treatment, or willfully causing great suffering
or serious injury to body or health); see also BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 359-60.
200. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 137, art. 27; Additional Protocol II, supra
note 143, art. 4(2)(e).
201. Additional Protocol II, supra note 143, art. 75(2)(b).
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prostitution, and any form of indecent assault.202 The ICTR and ICTY have
also found that rape and other acts of sexual violence can amount to
outrages upon personal dignity. The ICTR Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v.
Akayesu found that forcing women to publicly perform gymnastics in the
nude constituted an outrage upon their personal dignity.203 The ICTY Trial
Chamber in Prosecutor v. Furundzija convicted the accused of torture and
outrages upon personal dignity, including rape.204 In Prosecutor v.
Kunarac, the ICTY Trial Chamber found that rape, forcing victims to
dance naked on a table, and lending and selling victims to other men
constituted outrages upon personal dignity.205 In Prosecutor v. Delalic,
forcing brothers to perform oral sex on each other before other prisoners
constituted outrages upon personal dignity.206
Finally, rape and other forms of sexual violence may in some
circumstances also constitute a violation of the prohibitions under Common
Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, including violence to life and person,
which also covers mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture.207
c. Other Gendered Crimes
There are additional crimes enumerated under the Rome Statute, which
may in some circumstances take a gendered-nature.
Attacks on the civilian population, which constitute a war crime in
international208 and non-international209 conflicts, have been said to have a
particular impact on women, children and the elderly because women
usually comprise the majority of the civilian population and because of the
gendered-nature an attack may assume.210 The UNSC in its 2008
202. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶ 688 (Sept. 2, 1998); Patricia Viseur Sellers & Elizabeth Bennion, Article 8(2)(b)(xxi):
Outrages upon Personal Dignity, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra
note 15, at 428; see also Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 119,
art. 3(e).
203. See Akayesu, Case No. ITCR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 697; Sellers
& Bennion, supra note 202, at 426; see also Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 21.
204. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/IT, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶¶ 183, 272 (Dec. 10, 1998) (finding that sexual assaults committed publicly amounted
to outrages upon the victim’s personal dignity); Sellers & Bennion, supra note 202,
at 428.
205. Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 159 (June 12, 2002); Sellers & Bennion, supra note 202, at 428.
206. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 10621066; see Sellers & Bennion, supra note 202, at 429.
207. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(c)(i); see Zimmermann, supra note 133, at
489.
208. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(i).
209. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(i).
210. See ASKIN, supra note 8, at 12-13.
Throughout the history of war, while male civilians are killed, female civilians
typically are raped, then killed. In torturous interrogations, males are savagely
beaten. Females are savagely beaten and raped. Conclusively, all civilians are
not treated similarly . . . . This law that applies to all civilians has tended not
to recognize the sexual abuses routinely committed against over half of the
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Resolution 1820 noted that
civilians account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by
armed conflict; that women and girls are particularly targeted by the use
of sexual violence, including as a tactic of war to humiliate, dominate,
instill fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a
community or ethnic group; and that sexual violence perpetrated in this
211
manner may in some instances persist after the cessation of hostilities.

The use of child soldiers, which is itself a war crime in international212
and non-international213 armed conflicts, can also take a gendered-form.
For instance, female child soldiers may also be used for other slave-like
practices, including sexual and domestic enslavement. Male child soldiers
may in some instances be used for more active combat roles.
Similarly abductions of males and females (prohibited as, for example, a
form of enslavement,214 sexual slavery, imprisonment,215 or taking of
hostages216) can occur with a specific gender-use in mind, such as for child
soldiers and sex slaves.
Genital and sexual mutilation of males and females may amount to the
war crime of subjecting persons to physical mutilation.217 The Trial
Chamber of the ICTR also found that mutilations of and acts of sexual
violence to a dead body amounted to a crime against humanity under the
category of other inhumane acts because of the mental suffering to eyecivilian population—the women.
Id.; see also Callamard, supra note 8, at 67, 93 (stating that “[a]lthough women are less
likely than men to be combatants, women are more likely to form the greatest
proportion of the adult civilian population killed in war and targeted for abuse,” thus
“[a]s the majority of the civilian population, women, children, and older people are
particularly vulnerable to attacks by either part to the conflict”); Judith Gardam, The
Neglected Aspect of Women and Armed Conflict: Progressive Development of the Law,
53 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 197, 208-09 (2005) (referring to the study of the
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), WOMEN FACING WAR: ICRC
STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF ARMED CONFLICT ON WOMEN (2001), in which the ICRC
referred to specific needs of women in times of armed conflict derived from “socially
defined or constructed sex roles, attitudes and values . . . ascribe[d] as appropriate for
one sex or the other”); Michelle Jarvis, An Emerging Gender Perspective on
International Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE
LAW OF THE ICTY 157, 186-87 (Gideon Boas & William A. Schabas eds., 2003).
211. S.C. Res. 1820, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 19, 2008).
212. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi).
213. Id. art. 8(2)(e)(vii).
214. Id. art. 7(1)(c) (defining enslavement directed against a civilian population as a
crime against humanity).
215. Id. art. 7(1)(e).
216. Id. art. 8(2)(a)(viii) (defining the taking of hostages as one of the grave
breaches of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 137).
217. Id. arts. 8(2)(b)(x), 8(2)(e)(xi) (applying to international and non-international
armed conflicts, respectively).
Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to physical
mutilation . . . which are neither justified by the medical, dental or hospital
treatment of the person concerned nor carried out in his or her interest, and
which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such person or
persons.
Id. art. 8(2)(b)(x).
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witnesses of the same ethnic group.218
2. Defining the Sexual Violence and Gender-Based Crimes
The Rome Statute and Elements of Crimes also provided the first
explicitly stated definitions in the legal framework of an international
criminal court of the listed sexual violence and gender-based crimes
described below.219 All of the sexual violence crimes—except for forced
pregnancy, which by definition can only be committed against women—
are defined in gender-neutral terms so that victims and perpetrators may be
of either sex or gender.220
a. Rape
Before rape was defined under the Elements of Crimes, there was no
explicitly stated definition of rape under international humanitarian or
human rights law instruments.221 The definition of rape under the Elements
of Crimes reflects a number of prior developments in the law on rape
before international criminal courts. First, the definition of rape includes
the concept of a physical invasion of the victim’s body.222 The Trial
Chamber of the ICTR in Prosecutor v. Akayesu defined rape as “a physical
invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances
which are coercive.”223
218. See Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR 98-44A-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 936 (Dec. 1, 2003) (finding that piercing the side and sexual
organs of the body of a woman victim and cutting off the breast of a girl were acts that
“constitute a serious attack on the human dignity of the Tutsi community as a whole”
and “are nefarious acts of a comparable gravity to the other acts listed as crimes against
humanity, which would clearly cause great mental suffering to any members of the
Tutsi community who observed them”); see also Boot, supra note 191, at 231.
219. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 9, 21(1)(a); Cottier, supra note 17, at 435;
see also Herman von Hebel, The Making of the Elements of Crimes, in ICC: CRIMES,
PROCEDURE & EVIDENCE, supra note 11, at 7-8, 13 (dealing with the status of the
Elements of Crimes).
220. See Cottier, supra note 17, at 436 (referring to the U.N. Slavery Special
Rapporteur Report, supra note 59, ¶ 24, which states that “it must be noted that women
are more at risk of being victims of sexually violent crimes and face gender-specific
obstacles in seeking redress”).
221. See Boot, supra note 15, at 209 & n.233 (observing that the definition of rape
was influenced by the U.N. Slavery Special Rapporteur’s Report, in which she defined
rape as “the insertion, under conditions of force, coercion or duress, of any object,
including but not limited to a penis, into a victim’s vagina or anus; or the insertion,
under conditions of force, coercion or duress, of a penis into the mouth of the victim”).
The U.N. Slavery Special Rapporteur’s Report further provides that this definition
reflected current international elaborations including working definitions of rape used
by the Offices of the Prosecutor of the ICTY and ICTR. See U.N. Slavery Special
Rapporteur Report, supra note 59, ¶ 24; see also Cottier, supra note 17, at 436 (stating
that there was no definition of rape in international humanitarian or human rights law
instruments prior to the Elements of Crimes, supra note 124, and domestic legal
systems contained different definitions of rape).
222. ICC, Report of the Preparatory Commission, supra note 199, art. 7(1)(g)-1
(“[t]he perpetrator invaded the body of a person”); see Boot, supra note 15, at 209
n.232 (citing RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: A LEGAL STUDY, FINAL REPORT OF THE
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2, Vol. I, annex II).
223. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
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Second, rape as defined does not require that the physical invasion be
committed by physical force, but instead can be perpetrated by a “threat of
force or coercion . . . or by taking advantage of a coercive environment,
or . . . against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.”224 In
Akayesu, the Trial Chamber defined rape as involving circumstances that
are coercive, and stated that coercive circumstances did not need to be
evidenced by a show of force.225 In particular, the Trial Chamber observed
that “[t]hreats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which prey
on fear or desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion may be
inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed conflict or military
presence.”226
Third, the definition of rape is not based on concepts related to the
consent of the victim. The only reference to consent is to clarify
circumstances in which individuals are said to be incapable of consent.227
¶ 688 (Sept. 2, 1998); Boot, supra note 15, at 209 (observing that the Trial Chamber
decided Akayesu six weeks after the Rome Diplomatic Conference and that the Trial
Chamber, after noting that there was no commonly accepted definition of rape under
international law, reflected in part on the approach of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Slavery, and legal arguments submitted by non-governmental organizations); La Haye,
supra note 11, at 188.
224. ICC, Report of the Preparatory Commission, supra note 199, arts. 7(1)(g)-1
n.16, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1 n.51, 8(2)(e)(vi)-1 n.63 (notes 16, 61, and 63 state that “[i]t is
understood that a person may be incapable of giving genuine consent if affected by
natural, induced or age-related incapacity”); see also La Haye, supra note 11, at 189
(stating that “[t]he intention of the drafters here is clearly to point out that coercive
circumstances are not restricted to the use of physical force”).
225. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 596, 688;
Boot, supra note 15, at 209.
226. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 688 (stating
that “the manifestly coercive circumstances that exist in all armed conflict situations
establish a presumption of non-consent and negates the need for the prosecution to
establish a lack of consent as an element of the crime”); Boot, supra note 15, at 209;
see also U.N. Slavery Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 59, ¶ 25; Cottier, supra
note 17, at 440-41 (stating that coercive environment “can be understood as referring
to, inter alia, vertical power relations between troops conquering a village and the
inhabitants of that village or between a detained person and his or her guards”).
227. See Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR 2001-64-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, ¶¶ 155-157 (June 17, 2004); Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case Nos. IT-9623 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 130 (June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v.
Kunarac et al., Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶¶ 457-458 (Feb. 22, 2001); Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 72, ICC-ASP/1/3
(Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence] (providing that the
Chamber must be satisfied that any evidence regarding “consent” is relevant or
admissible and of sufficient probative value, and must take into account any potential
prejudice of that evidence in accordance with Article 69(4), must have regard to
Articles 67, 68, 21(3), and Rules 70(a) through (d), and must consider the views of the
Prosecutor, Defense, and witness or victim); see also Boot, supra note 15, at 209-10
(referring to the definitions of rape used by the U.N. Slavery Special Rapporteur and
Akayesu Trial Chamber Judgment, as reflected in the ICC’s Elements of Crimes, supra
note 124). Boot asserts that “[n]either definition was based on outdated concepts of
consent by the victim, which often led in practice in national courts to the burden of
proof perversely shifting to the victim to demonstrate that he or she had not consented
and to coerced ‘consent’ being a defence to a charge of rape.” Boot also observed that
the Appeals Chamber in the ICTY decision in Kunarac and ICTR decision in
Gacumbitsi approved the reintroduction of the concept of non-consent by the Trial
Chambers, but at the same time indicated that circumstances in which crimes against
humanity took place were almost always coercive. See Boot, supra note 15, at 209-10;
see also Cottier, supra note 17, at 438-41 (considering the manner in which the ICTY
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Cottier states that the Preparatory Commission decided not to frame the
issue of consent in terms of a ground for excluding criminal
responsibility.228 Catharine MacKinnon declares “[t]he recognition that
consent is meaningless for acts of a sexual nature that have a nexus to
genocide, armed conflict, and crimes against humanity was a tremendous
breakthrough.”229
Fourth, rape involves not just penetration of a perpetrator’s penis into a
female victim’s vagina, but relates to any part of the victim’s body or
perpetrator’s body with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of
the victim with any object or any other part of the body.230 In Akayesu, the
Trial Chamber of the ICTR observed that acts of rape may include acts that
involve the insertion of objects and/or use of bodily orifices not considered
intrinsically sexual.231 The Trial Chamber also found that the insertion of a
piece of wood into the sexual organs of a dying woman amounted to
rape.232 In Furundzija, the ICTY Trial Chamber also qualified forced oral
penetration with a male sexual organ as rape.233 Furthermore, rape includes
dealt with consent and criminal responsibility concerning sexual activity in armed
conflict and observing that the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Kunarac Appeals
Chamber Judgment clarified that there was no requirement for showing “resistance” by
the victim, nor a requirement to show any force, and that it sufficed to show coercive
circumstances); Cottier also cites to several national criminal provisions establishing
strict liability of a person in an unequal power position engaging in sexual acts with a
victim who is under their influence because of that unequal power position. See id.
Cottier further declares that the Furundzija Trial Chamber Judgment suggests “a nonrefutable and abstract presumption of non-consent when stating that ‘any form of
captivity vitiates consent.’” Id. Cottier also states that the Trial Chamber in Akayesu
similarly only required that rape be committed under coercive circumstances. Id.
Cottier refers to the U.N. Slavery Special Rapporteur’s Report which states that “[t]he
manifestly coercive circumstances that exist in all armed conflict situations establish a
presumption of non-consent and negates the need for the prosecution to establish a lack
of consent as an element of the crime.” See La Haye, supra note 11, at 189 (stating that
non-consent is not an element of the crime of rape when coercive circumstances are
involved); Spees, supra note 108, at 25.
228. Cottier, supra note 17, at 440.
229. MacKinnon, supra note 76, at 212-13 (observing that the Appeals Chamber of
the ICTY in Gacumbitsi sustained Akayesu by holding that “as a matter of fact if not
law, that under coercive circumstances nonconsent is not a separate element to be
proven, but can be inferred from those circumstances”); Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR
2001-64-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 291-293; see also Chinkin, supra note 8,
at 124-26.
230. ICC, Report of the Preparatory Commission, supra note 199, art. 7(1)(g)-1
(emphasis added) (defining the elements of the crime of rape as “conduct resulting in
penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator
with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or
any other part of the body”).
231. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 596, 686687; see also Boot, supra note 15, at 209 (stating that “[t]he Chamber considered that
rape is a form of aggression and that the central elements of the crime of rape cannot be
captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts”).
232. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 686; Cottier,
supra note 17, at 438; see also La Haye, supra note 11, at 189 (explaining that
“following sexual atrocities committed in armed conflicts such as in Rwanda, [it was
considered that] rape can consist of the penetration of the anal or genital opening of the
victim with any object or any other part of the body”).
233. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment,
¶¶ 174, 183 (Dec. 10, 1998); Cottier, supra note 17, at 437; Goldstone, supra note 23,

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol17/iss2/6

42

Lupig: Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes b

all penetration, however slight. 234
Finally, the definition of rape includes both male and female victims of
the crime.235 The Elements of Crimes, including the identity of the victim
and perpetrator are stated in gender-neutral terms. Moreover, the Elements
of the Crimes explicitly state that “[t]he concept of ‘invasion’ is intended to
be broad enough to be gender-neutral.”236
b. Sexual Slavery
The Elements of Crimes define sexual slavery as the exercise by the
perpetrator of “any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership
over one or more persons.”237 Examples given are purchasing, selling,
lending, or bartering such person(s) “or by imposing on them a similar
deprivation of liberty.”238 The Elements of Crimes of sexual slavery
stipulate that the phrase, “deprivation of liberty” may include exacting
forced labor or otherwise reducing individuals to a servile status as defined
under the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956.239 It is
also explicitly said to include trafficking in persons, in particular women
and children.240 The elements of the crime of sexual slavery provide that
at 284; see also La Haye, supra note 11, at 189 (asserting that the intent of the drafters
was to include oral penetration in the definition of rape).
234. ICC, Report of the Preparatory Commission, supra note 199, art. 7(1)(g)-1
(referring to “conduct resulting in penetration, however slight”); see also Boot, supra
note 15, at 209 (states that during the Rome Diplomatic Conference, one state defined
the actus reus of rape as the “forcible penetration, however slight, of any part of the
body of another by the accused’s sexual organ, or forcible penetration, however slight,
of any part of the body of another by the accused’s sexual organ, or forcible
penetration, however slight of the anal or genital opening of another by an object”);
Cottier, supra note 17, at 437-38 (observing that the Elements of Crimes reflect the
definition of rape of the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-9517/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 174, 183 (Dec. 10, 1998), which defined rape as
sexual penetration, however slight).
235. See Boot, supra note 15, at 210 (stating that the essential gender-neutral aspects
of this crime are the physical invasion of the body of the victim and coercion, with a
focus on the action by the perpetrator); see also Cottier, supra note 17, at 438 (stating
the long formulation was due to the Preparatory Commission’s intention to formulate a
gender-neutral definition, and noting that the Elements of Crimes also cover sexual
intercourse forced on a man by a woman); La Haye, supra note 11, at 188 (observing
that an important aspect of the word “invasion” is its “gender-neutral” nature, “as all
delegations clearly wanted to cover rape against a victim of either sex” and that the
Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, ¶ 180 (Dec. 10, 1998), recognized that rape can be committed against a man
or woman).
236. ICC, Report of the Preparatory Commission, supra note 199, arts. 7(1)(g)-1
n.15, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-1 n.50, 8(2)(e)(vi)-1 n.62 (“The concept of ‘invasion’ is intended to
be broad enough to be gender-neutral.”).
237. See id. art. 7(1)(g)-2, art. 8(2)(b)(xxii)-2, art. 8(2)(e)(vi)-2.
238. See id. art. 7(1)(g)-2, art. 8(2)(b)(xxii)-2, art. 8(2)(e)(vi)-2.
239. See id. art. 7(1)(g)-2 n.18, art. 8(2)(b)(xxii)-2 n.53, art 8(2)(e)(vi)-2 n.65.
240. See id. arts. 7(1)(g)-2 n.18, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-2 n.53, 8(2)(e)(vi)-2 n.65.
It is understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some circumstances,
include exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to servile status
as defined in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956. It is
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the perpetrator need only have caused the person(s) to engage in one or
more acts of a sexual nature.241 Boot argues that there is no requirement to
prove rape for this crime.242 There is also no requirement to prove that the
perpetrator coerced the victim.243 In the Elements of Crimes it is stipulated
that this category of crime can “involve more than one perpetrator as a part
of a common criminal purpose.”244
Sexual slavery as a form of enslavement denotes limitations on one’s
autonomy, freedom of movement, and power to decide on matters relating
to one’s sexual activity.245 Sexual slavery also encompasses “situations
where women and girls are forced into ‘marriage’, domestic servitude or
other forced labour, that involves forced sexual activity, including rape, by
their captors.”246 The Special Rapporteur of the Working Group on
Contemporary Forms of Slavery (UN Slavery Rapporteur) stated that
practices such as detention of women in rape camps or “comfort stations,”
forced marriages to soldiers, and other practices involving treating women
as chattel are “in fact and in law forms of slavery and as such, violations of
the peremptory norm prohibiting slavery.”247
also understood that the conduct described in this element includes trafficking
in persons, in particular women and children.
Id. at nn.11, 18, 53, 65; see also id. art. 7(2)(c) (referring explicitly to the crime against
humanity of enslavement as including “the exercise of such power in the course of
trafficking in persons, in particular women and children”); Cottier, supra note 17,
at 445-46; see also La Haye, supra note 11, at 190-92 (observing that the Swiss
proposal included aspects of the definition of sexual slavery provided in U.N. Slavery
Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 59, ¶ 27 (“the status or condition of a person
over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised,
including sexual access through rape or other forms of sexual violence”) and observing
that delegations expressed the view that the phrase “similar deprivation of liberty”
should not exclude the situation in the Rwandan and Bosnian conflicts in which
sexually abused women were not locked in a particular place and were “‘free to go’ but
were in fact deprived of their liberty as they had nowhere else to go and feared for their
lives”); Oosterveld, supra note 155, at 634-35; Steains, supra note 62, at 370
(observing that this specific reference to trafficking in persons in the context of
enslavement, in particular trafficking in women and children, represented an important
embodiment of developments in international law).
241. ICC, Report of the Preparatory Commission, supra note 199, arts. 7(1)(g)-2,
8(2)(b)(xxii)-2, 8(2)(e)(vi)-2.
242. See Boot, supra note 15, at 213.
243. Compare Boot, supra note 15, at 212, with Cottier, supra note 17, at 444. See
Oosterveld, supra note 155, at 640 (stating that “[p]rima facie, a finding of
enslavement means that a victim has no ability to give voluntary or genuine consent.”).
In reference to the decisions of the Trial and Appeals Chambers in the ICTY in
Kunarac, Kovac, and Vukovic, Oosterveld observed “the fact that consent cannot serve
as a defense to the crime of sexual slavery is another advance in international law”).
See Oosterveld, supra.
244. ICC, Report of the Preparatory Commission, supra note 199, arts. 7(1)(g)-2
n.17, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-2 n.52, 8(2)(e)(vi)-2 n.64 (stating that “[g]iven the complex nature
of this crime, it is recognized that its commission could involve more than one
perpetrator as a part of a common criminal purpose”).
245. See Boot, supra note 15, at 211; see also Cottier, supra note 17, at 443
(asserting that exercise of ownership is akin to treatment of chattel and that “control
and deprivation of one’s autonomy,” such as restrictions on freedom of movement or
control of sexual access, can be considered essential elements of slavery).
246. See Boot, supra note 15, at 211.
247. See id.; U.N. Slavery Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 59, ¶¶ 8, 30; see
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c. Enforced Prostitution
The Elements of Crimes define enforced prostitution as situations in
which the perpetrator caused one or more persons to engage in one or more
acts of a sexual nature.248 This crime does not require that force was used,
and it is enough to demonstrate “threat of force or coercion, such as that
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or
abuse of power . . . or by taking advantage of a coercive environment.”249
Similar to the crime of rape, this crime is not based on concepts of consent
and consent is only mentioned to clarify where a person is incapable of
giving “genuine consent.”250
The second non-contextual element of this crime is that “the perpetrator
or another person obtained or expected to obtain pecuniary or other
advantage in exchange for or in connection with the acts of a sexual
nature.”251 Machteld Boot argues that the crime of enforced prostitution,
like the crime of sexual slavery, does not require proof of rape and that it
can constitute a continuing offense or separate act.252 Cottier states that in
contrast to rape, a victim of enforced prostitution may not be aware of any
coercive circumstances.253
d. Forced Pregnancy
The Elements of Crimes define forced pregnancy as situations in which
the perpetrator “confined one or more women forcibly made pregnant.”254
Boot argues that “unlawful confinement” should be interpreted as any form
also Cottier, supra note 17, at 446 (referring to the example of “forced marriages” as
forming a category of sexual slavery that reduces a person to servile status). Cottier
also cites to the U.N. Slavery Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 59, ¶ 13, which
states that “[t]he repeated rape and sexual abuse of women and girls under the guise of
‘marriage’ constitutes slavery, as the victims do not have the freedom to leave, to
refuse the sham ‘marriage’ or to decide whether and on what terms to engage in sexual
activity.” See also Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, 266 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 1 (1956).
248. ICC, Report of the Preparatory Commission, supra note 199, art. 7(1)(g)-3, art.
8(2)(b)(xxii)-3, art. 8(2)(e)(vi)-3.
249. See Boot, supra note 15, at 212 (referring to the argument found in U.N.
Slavery Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 59, ¶ 31, that this crime generally refers
to “conditions of control over a person who is coerced by another to engage in sexual
activity”). Boot argues that while most, if not all, forms of “forced prostitution” are
encompassed by “sexual slavery,” there may be situations in which forced prostitution
does not amount to “slavery,” but is still prohibited because the victim was compelled
to perform sexual acts. See id.; see also La Haye, supra note 11, at 192-93; Oosterveld,
supra note 155, at 644.
250. ICC, Report of the Preparatory Commission, supra note 199, arts. 7(1)(g)-4,
8(2)(b)(xxii)-4, 8(2)(e)(vi)-4.
251. See La Haye, supra note 11, at 193 (stating that some delegations at the
Preparatory Commission stressed that “the ‘other person’ expecting an advantage can
also be the victim herself or himself, hoping simply not to be killed”).
252. See Boot, supra note 15, at 213.
253. See also Cottier, supra note 17, at 448.
254. ICC, Report of the Preparatory Commission, supra note 199, arts. 7(1)(g)-4,
8(2)(b)(xxii)-4, 8(2)(e)(vi)-4. Article 7(2)(f) repeats the same objective elements, but in
addition, adds that “[t]his definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting
national laws relating to pregnancy.”
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of deprivation of physical liberty contrary to international law and
standards and does not require the deprivation of liberty to be severe.255 He
asserts that to be forcibly made pregnant does not require the use of
violence but includes any form of coercion.256 He argues that while
consent is not relevant to this crime, coercion negates consent, as it does in
any form of captivity.257 Boot further observes that the act of forcibly
impregnating a woman does not necessarily have to be committed by the
person confining the woman258 and that the forcible impregnation may
involve rape or “any other form of sexual violence of comparable
gravity.”259
The elements of the crime of forced pregnancy require that the
perpetrator confined the victim forcibly made pregnant “with the intent of
affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other
grave violations of international law.”260 Boot argues that these other grave
violations of international law include the crime of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes, including torture and enforced
disappearances.261
e. Enforced Sterilization
The Elements of Crimes define enforced sterilization as the perpetrator
depriving one or more persons of biological reproductive capacity262 where
255. See Boot, supra note 156, at 255; see also La Haye, supra note 11, at 193
(observing that the term “forced or enforced pregnancy” was used previously in
international documents such as the Vienna Declaration and Platform for Action, the
Beijing Platform for Action, and resolutions of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998).
256. See Boot, supra note 156, at 256.
257. See id. (stating that “‘[f]orcibly’ means ‘done by or involving force’ which
does not necessarily require the use of violence, but includes any form of coercion . . .
[and] any form of ‘coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third
person’ negates consent and any form of captivity negates consent”); Cottier, supra
note 17, at 450.
258. See Boot, supra note 156, at 256; see also La Haye, supra note 11, at 194
(stating that the separate elements of forced pregnancy “made it clear that the accused
need not be the person who made the woman or women pregnant”).
259. See Boot, supra note 156, at 256.
260. ICC, Report of the Preparatory Commission, supra note 199, arts. 7(1)(g)-4,
8(2)(b)(xxii)-4, 8(2)(e)(vi)-4.
261. See Boot, supra note 156, at 256.
262. See Elements of Crimes, supra note 124, arts. 7(1)(g)-(5) n.19, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-5
n.54, 8(2)(e)(vi)-5 n.66 (providing that “[t]he deprivation is not intended to include
birth-control measures which have a non-permanent effect in practice”).
It is doubtful, however, whether the exception in footnote 19 is consistent with
international law. Even imposing non-permanent measures intended to prevent
births within a protected group could be used to commit genocide by reducing
the birth rate within that group. In addition, such non-permanent measures
could violate a wide variety of human rights to personal autonomy even when
imposed on a non-discriminatory basis, including the right not to be subjected
to arbitrary interference with one’s family.
Boot, supra note 15, at 214; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A.
Res. 217A, art. 12, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 10, 1948); Cottier, supra note 17, at 451; La Haye, supra note 11, at 196 (stating
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that conduct was not justified by the medical or hospital treatment of the
person concerned and was not carried out with the victim’s genuine
consent. It is explicitly stated that “genuine consent” does not include
consent obtained through deception.263
f. Any Other Form of Sexual Violence
The Elements of Crimes define any other form of “sexual violence” as
where the perpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or
more persons or caused such person(s) to engage in an act of a sexual
nature.264 The Elements of Crimes do not require the use of force; it
suffices if the crime was committed “by threat of force or coercion, such as
that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression
or abuse of power . . . or by taking advantage of a coercive
environment.”265 The definition of sexual violence is not based on
concepts of consent. In fact, the only reference to consent is to clarify that
the act may also occur where a person is incapable of giving genuine
consent.266
The ICTR, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, considered sexual violence, which
includes rape, as any act of a sexual nature committed on a person under
coercive circumstances.267 The UN Slavery Rapporteur has stated that
sexual violence includes both physical and psychological violence carried
out through sexual means or by targeting sexuality, and includes both
physical and psychological attacks directed at a person’s sexual
characteristics.268
that “[t]he definition covers cases of temporary or permanent sterilization alike and is
not restricted to the surgical removal of the reproductive organs. It will encompass any
means or measures, which have the effect of depriving a person of his or her biological
reproductive capacity.”).
263. See Elements of Crimes, supra note 124, arts. 7(1)(g)-5 n.20, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-5
n.55, 8(2)(e)(vi)-5 n.67 (noting that “[i]t is understood that ‘genuine consent’ does not
include consent obtained through deception”); see also La Haye, supra note 11, at 196.
264. See ICC, Report of the Preparatory Commission, supra note 199, arts. 7(1)(g)6, 8(2)(b)(xxii)-6, 8(2)(e)(vi)-6; see also La Haye, supra note 11, at 197-98 (observing
that the term sexual “violence” was preferred to sexual “assault” because the term
“assault” might not include such acts as forcible nudity, which delegations believed
should be open to prosecution under the crime of sexual violence).
265. See Boot, supra note 15, at 215.
266. See id. at 214.
267. See id.; see also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber
Judgment, ¶ 688 (Sept. 2, 1998) (noting that in this context coercive circumstances
need not be evidenced by a show of physical force, and that “[t]hreats, intimidation,
extortion, and other forms of duress which prey on fear or desperation may constitute
coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed conflict
or the military presence of Interahamwe among refugee Tutsi women at the bureau
communal”).
268. See Boot, supra note 15, at 214; see also ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 38-39 (2d ed. 2008) (stating that sexual violence includes rape, sexual
slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and any other
form of sexual violence of comparable gravity); Cassese, supra note 148, at 374-75;
Cottier, supra note 17, at 452 (describing public forcible nudity, genital mutilation, and
slicing off a woman’s breasts (citing the discussion in U.N. Slavery Special Rapporteur
Report, supra note 59, ¶¶ 21-22)).
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In Akayesu, the ICTR also found that sexual violence does not require
physical invasion, penetration, or physical contact.269 Akayesu was found
criminally responsible for ordering his subordinates to undress a female
and force her to do gymnastics naked before a crowd in the public
courtyard of the bureau communal.270 Similarly the ICTY Trial Chamber
in Prosecutor v. Furundzjia found that sexual assault “falling short of
actual penetration” is also prohibited, and that this prohibition “embraces
all serious abuses of a sexual nature inflicted upon the physical and moral
integrity of a person by means of coercion, threat, force, or intimidation in
a way that is degrading and humiliating for the victim’s dignity.”271 The
ICTY Trial Chamber held in Prosecutor v. Kvocka that sexual violence
includes sexual mutilation (where it does not amount to enforced
sterilization), forced marriage (insofar as it does not amount to sexual
slavery), forced abortion, and sexual molestation.272 In Prosecutor v.
Todorovic, the Trial Chamber also qualified biting into a penis and kicking
in the genital area as sexual assault.273
In Akayesu the ICTR Trial Chamber found that “sexual violence” can
constitute the crime against humanity of inhumane acts, as well as acts
amounting to outrages upon personal dignity in violation of Common
Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol II, and the
crime of genocide of serious bodily or mental harm.274
D. Modes of Liability
The modes of liability under the Rome Statute make no express
reference to any of the crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, as those deemed liable for sexual and gender-based crimes
may be the commanders or superiors responsible for the sexual and gender-

269. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 688.
270. See id. ¶¶ 688, 692-694 (finding that Akayesu was found responsible for these

acts under Article 3(i) of the ICTR Statute, supra note 61); see also Boot, supra note
15, at 214 n.258; Koenig & Askin, supra note 10, at 25.
271. See Boot, supra note 15, at 214-15; see also Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No.
IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 186 (Dec. 10, 1998).
272. See Cottier, supra note 17, at 452; see also Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case
No. IT-98-30/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 180 (Nov. 2, 2001) (holding that “sexual
violence is broader than rape and includes such crimes as sexual slavery or
molestation”).
273. See Prosecutor v. Todorovic, Case No. IT-95-9/I-S, Trial Chamber Sentencing
Judgment, ¶¶ 38, 66 (July 31, 2001); see also Cottier, supra note 17, at 452.
274. See Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 688 (holding
that sexual violence falls within the scope of the crimes against humanity of “other
inhumane acts” included in Article 3(i), “outrages upon personal dignity” under Article
4(e) of the ICTR Statute, supra note 61, which are also violations of Common Article 3
to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 137, and of Additional Protocol II, supra note
143, and of the genocide of “serious bodily or mental harm” included in Article 2(2)(b)
of the ICTR Statute, supra note 61); see also Boot, supra note 15, at 214 n.258;
Chinkin, supra note 8, at 126-27 (referring to the Akayesu decision, which stated that
sexual violence could include forced nudity, forced sterilisation or experimentation,
sexual mutilation, sexual threats, rapes, and so forth).
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based crimes their subordinates physically perpetrate,275 it is useful to refer
to the following two key provisions.
Article 25 of the Statute276 provides for individual criminal
responsibility, in particular where an individual:
•

•
•

•

Commits a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another
or through another person, regardless of whether that other
person is criminally responsible;
Orders, solicits, or induces the commission of such a crime
which in fact occurs or is attempted;
For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime,
aids, abets, or otherwise assists in its commission or attempted
commission, including by providing the means for its
commission;
In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted
commission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a
common purpose.

Article 28 of the Statute ascribes criminal responsibility to commanders
and other superiors for crimes committed by forces/subordinates under the
superiors’ effective authority and control (or effective command and
control), for crimes committed as a result of his or her failure to exercise
control properly.277
E. Protective and Special Measures to Protect Victims and Witnesses
Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute stipulates that the Court take
“appropriate measures” to protect the safety, physical and psychological
well-being, dignity, and privacy of victims and witnesses.278 The Court is
required to consider all relevant factors including gender and the nature of
the crime, particularly where the crime involves sexual or gender violence
or violence against children.279 Donat-Cattin states that “appropriate
measures” have been interpreted, inter alia, to include those set out in the
following Rules and Regulations.280
Rule 112(4) for recording of questioning. This includes use of audiovideo recording to reduce “re-traumatisation of a victim of sexual or
281
gender violence”;
275. See ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the
Office of the Prosecutor 6-7 (Sept. 2003) (stating that “as a general rule [the OTP]
should focus its investigative and prosecutorial efforts and resources on those who bear
the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or organization allegedly
responsible for those crimes”).
276. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 25(3)(a-d).
277. See id. art. 28(a-b).
278. See id. art. 68(1).
279. See Steains, supra note 62, at 387; see also Bensouda, supra note 2, at 415.
280. See David Donat-Cattin, Article 68: Protection of Victims and Witnesses and
Their Participation in the Proceedings, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra
note 15, at 1275, 1281.
281. See Hakan Friman, Investigation and Prosecution, in ICC: CRIMES, PROCEDURE
& EVIDENCE, supra note 11, at 493, 514-15 (stating that the intention behind this
amendment was that “the recorded testimonies of such persons might be later used at
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Rule 87 Protective measures can include expunging the person’s
identity from the public records; presentation of testimony by electronic
or other special means including alteration of pictures or voice; use of
audio-video technology (e.g., video-conferencing and closed-circuit
television); exclusive use of sound media; use of a pseudonym; and
282
proceedings conducted in camera;
Rule 88 Special measures can include the facilitation of the testimony
of a traumatized victim or witness, including a victim of sexual violence.
For instance, a lawyer, legal representative, psychologist, or family
member may be permitted to be present during the testimony of the
victim or witness. Rule 88(4) provides that the Chamber must be
“vigilant in controlling the manner of questioning a witness or victim to
avoid any harassment or intimidation, paying particular attention to
283
attacks on victims of crimes of sexual violence.”
Regulations of the Court
Regulation 21 Protection of sensitive information in broadcasts of audio
284
or video-recordings;
Regulation 41 Victims and Witnesses Unit may bring to the Chamber’s
285
attention the need for special measures under Rules 87 and 88;
286
Regulation 42 Applications and variations of protective measures;
287
Regulation 101 Restrictions on access to news and contact.
Regulations of the Registry
Regulation 79 Enabling witnesses to testify without further harm,
288
suffering, or trauma;
289
Regulation 100 Protection and security of victims.

Donat-Cattin also argues that there is room for “any other arrangement
that may be made through innovative technology or building upon methods
of victims’ protection experimented in domestic justice systems.” 290
Regulation 94 of the Regulations of the Registry also lists various
protective measures that may be included pursuant to an order under Rule
87, including pseudonyms, facial and voice distortions, private sessions,
closed sessions, videoconferences, expunction from the public record of the
person’s identity, and any combination of protective measures that are
technically feasible.291
Article 64 of the Statute requires the Trial Chamber to ensure that the
trial, if the Court so allowed, without having to go over once again their painful
experience. This could assist in reducing any subsequent traumatization.”).
282. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 228, R. 87.
283. See id. R. 88.
284. See ICC Regulations of the Court Reg. 21, ICC-BD/01-01-04 (May 26, 2005)
[hereinafter ICC Regulations].
285. See id. Reg. 41.
286. See id. Reg. 42.
287. See id. Reg. 101.
288. See ICC Regulations of the Registry, ICC-BD/03-01-06 (2006) [hereinafter
Registry Regulations]; id. Reg. 79.
289. See id. Reg. 100.
290. See Donat-Cattin, supra note 280, at 1281.
291. See Registry Regulations, supra note 288, Reg. 94.
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trial is conducted showing due regard for the protection of victims and
witnesses, including for the protection of confidential information.292 In
Prosecutor v. Tadic, the ICTY Trial Chamber recognized the special needs
of victims and witnesses of rape and sexual assault, particularly in terms of
the consequences of the crime on the victim and the consequences of
testifying.293 Such witnesses’ rights have also been affirmed by the U.N.
and under international human rights law.294
Article 68(2) of the Rome Statute also envisages an exception to the
principle of public hearings provided for in Article 67 by protecting
victims, witnesses, or even the accused, by allowing for proceedings in
camera, or presentation of evidence by electronic or other special means.295
It is stated that “in particular, such measures shall be implemented in the
case of a victim of sexual violence,” or a child victim or witness.296 Other
292. See Bensouda, supra note 2, at 415.
293. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Prosecutor’s

Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, ¶ 46 (Aug. 10,
1995).
The existence of special concerns for victims and witnesses of sexual assault is
evident in the Report of the Secretary-General, which states that protection for
victims and witnesses should be granted, “especially in cases of rape and
sexual assault” . . . . It has been noted that rape and sexual assault often have
particularly devastating consequences which, in certain instances, may have a
permanent detrimental impact on the victim . . . . It has been noted further that
testifying about the event is often difficult, particularly in public, and can result
in rejection by the victim’s family and community . . . . In addition, traditional
court practice and procedures have been known to exacerbate the victim’s
ordeal during trial. Women who have been raped and have sought justice in
the legal system commonly compare the experience to being raped a second
time.
Id.; see also RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
185-88 (2002) (noting that in Tadic, the Court referred to appropriate measures in these
circumstances as including “in camera proceedings, devices to avoid confrontation
with the accused in court and careful control of cross-examination”).
294. See Helen Brady, Protective and Special Measures for Victims and Witnesses,
in ICC: CRIMES, PROCEDURE & EVIDENCE, supra note 11, at 435 (referencing the
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power,
G.A. Res. 40/34, art. 6(d), U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/34 (Nov. 29, 1985)) (arguing that
international law demands that victims and witnesses be provided with the necessary
“protection and support to minimize serious risks to their security, avoid serious
incursions of their privacy and dignity, and reduce trauma associated with giving
testimony”); see also Baegen v. the Netherlands, App. No. 16696/90, Eur. Comm’n
H.R. Dec. & Rep., ¶ 77 (1994) (finding that where the accused was able to confront the
victim of sexual abuse but could not question her, the European Commission of Human
Rights had regard to “the special features of rape and sexual offences trials and
accepted that in criminal proceedings concerning sexual abuse measures may be taken
to protect the victim provided such are reconcilable with an adequate and effective
exercise of the rights of the defence”); KAREN REID, A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO THE
EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 142 (2003).
295. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 68(2).
296. See Donat-Cattin, supra note 280, at 1284. Donat-Cattin argues that the
identity of the witness needs to be disclosed to the defense, unless
anonymity is assessed as the only available measure of protection to comply
with the obligation [under Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute], the relevant
Chamber should order to maintain it and, at the same time, ensure that the
testimony rendered by the anonymous victim or witness shall be weighted
against this factor and never be the sole proof that would suffice to convict an
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provisions of the Statute deal more generally with the protection of victims
and witnesses during an investigation and prosecution,297 which can also be
of relevance to sexual and gender-based crime victims. The Office of the
Prosecutor attaches particular importance to its prevailing obligations
concerning the security of victims. Pursuant to Article 68(1) of the Statute,
which provides that “[t]he Court shall take appropriate measures to protect
the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of
victims and witnesses,” the standard of protection of the court should be the
elimination of any foreseeable risk.298 Further, the Presidency, the
Registry, and the Prosecution committed in the Strategic Plan of the Court
to “put in place a system to address all security risks, striving for maximum
security of all participants.”299
F. Evidentiary Rules and Rules of Interpretation
A number of key evidentiary rules also reflect developments in the law
related to prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes before
international criminal courts,300 including the following:
Consent: Rule 70 stipulates the principles of evidence in cases of sexual
violence, in particular the circumstances where consent cannot be
301
inferred, including where there was a coercive environment.

individual for any specific charge.
Id.; see also Brady, supra note 295, at 450-53 (observing that there was a difference of
opinion on the issue of anonymous witnesses at trial, and the decision was to remain
silent on the issue under Rule 88 “thereby leaving it up to the Court.”); MAY &
WIERDA, supra note 293, at 282-86.
297. See Brady, supra note 295, at 437 (citing Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts.
18(1), 54(1)(b), 57(3)(c), 64(2), 64(6)(e), 68, 69(2)).
298. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 68(1).
299. ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Strategic Plan of the International Criminal
Court, ICC-ASP/5/6, at 6 (Aug. 4, 2006), available at http://www2.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-6_English.pdf.
300. See Steains, supra note 62, at 384-85 (noting that the ICTY and the ICTR have
adopted rules of evidence and procedure that emphasize protection of victims).
301. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 228, at R. 70.
In cases of sexual violence, the Court shall be guided by and, where
appropriate, apply the following principles: (a) Consent cannot be inferred by
reason of any words or conduct of a victim where force, threat of force,
coercion or taking advantage of a coercive environment undermined the
victim’s ability to give voluntary and genuine consent; (b) Consent cannot be
inferred by reason of any words of conduct of a victim where the victim is
incapable of giving genuine consent; (c) Consent cannot be inferred by reason
of the silence of, or lack of resistance by, a victim to the alleged sexual
violence . . . .
Id.; see also Goldstone, supra note 23, at 284 (citing Rule 96 of the ICTY and ICTR,
both of which deal with consent). Goldstone states
[t]his starts from the premise that consent cannot be a defence if the victim had
experienced or had reason to fear violence, duress, detention or psychological
aggression. The procedure by which evidence of consent may be admitted
requires the defendant overcome the burden of proving to the Trial
Chamber . . . that the evidence is relevant and credible. Consequently the
opportunity is there, but the burden of proof is placed very clearly on the
defendant to establish why, in that war situation, consent is at all relevant to
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Prior or subsequent sexual conduct of the victim or witness: Rule
70(d) also states that the “[c]redibility, character or predisposition to
sexual availability of a victim or witness cannot be inferred by reason of
the sexual nature of the prior or subsequent conduct of a victim or
witness.” Similarly, Rule 71 specifies that, subject to Article 69(4), a
chamber shall not admit evidence of the prior or subsequent sexual
302
conduct of a victim or witness.
Privileged communications: Rule 73 provides that communications
occurring in the context of professional or other confidential
relationships are to be regarded as privileged. The Court shall give
particular regard to recognizing as privileged communications made in
the context of a professional relationship between a person and his or her
303
medical doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist, or counsellor.
Corroboration: Rule 63(4) provides that, without prejudice to Article
66(3) (regarding the presumption of innocence and need to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt), a chamber shall not
impose a legal requirement that corroboration is required to prove any
crime within the Court’s jurisdiction, “in particular, crimes of sexual
304
violence.”
This is a further progression from Rule 96 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence of the ad hoc tribunals, which provides that the
tribunals of the ICTY and ICTR need not require corroboration from
305
sexual violence victims.

Finally, Article 21(3) requires that the application and interpretation of
law be consistent with international human rights law, and without any
adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender.306
G. Victims’ Participation
Victims, including victims of sexual and gender-based crimes, whose
personal interests are affected, may be permitted to express their views and
the defence.
Id.; ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 228, R. 72 (requiring the Court
to be notified of any intention to elicit evidence of consent and to hear the views in
camera of the prosecutor, defense, and the victim-witness, and to take into account
whether that evidence has sufficient probative value, what prejudice that evidence may
cause, and to take account of arts. 21(3), 67, 68, and the principles of Rule 70).
302. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 228, R. 71 (stating that
evidence of other sexual conduct “[i]n the light of the definition and nature of the
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and subject to article 69, paragraph 4, a
Chamber shall not admit evidence of the prior or subsequent sexual conduct of a victim
or witness”); see also Goldstone, supra note 23, at 284 (observing that Rule 96 of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY and ICTR excluded admissibility of
prior sexual conduct of the victim “dispensing with the implication that a woman with
a sexual history is an unreliable witness”).
303. See ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 228, R. 73.
304. See id. R. 63(4).
305. See Goldstone, supra note 23, at 283 (noting that the provision that
corroboration is not required for sexual violence testimony is a departure from
domestic practice of many countries); see also KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 135, at 302
(recognizing that this provision affords “the testimony of a victim of sexual assault the
same presumption of reliability as the testimony of the victims of other crimes”).
306. See Steains, supra note 62, at 371-75 (noting that this distinction came only
after significant compromise and negotiations at the Rome Conference).
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concerns at appropriate stages of the proceedings.307
provide for reparations to victims.308

The Court may

IV. MAINSTREAMING AND TAKING A FOCUSED APPROACH TO SEXUAL
AND GENDER-BASED CRIMES FROM THE PRE-ANALYSIS PHASE ONWARD
Investigations in the Uganda case provide an example of the manner in
which the OTP has sought to ensure effective investigations and
prosecutions by mainstreaming and taking a focussed approach to sexual
and gender-based crimes from the pre-analysis phase onward.309
A. Pre-Investigative Analysis
During the pre-investigative analysis phase of the Uganda case, available
information was assessed regarding the key types of alleged crimes being
committed in northern Uganda, including alleged sexual and gender-based
crimes. The OTP has stated that it will endeavor to try a selection of cases
that represent the entire criminality and modes of victimization and pay
particular attention to methods of investigation of sexual and gender-based
crimes, and crimes committed against children.310
B. Knowledge of the Crimes and Best Practices to Conduct Interviews
The Gender and Children’s Unit (GCU) was established to provide
advice and assistance, including on sexual and gender-based crimes, to the
different divisions of the OTP.311 Moreover, focal points within joint teams
have been used to assist in coordinating the investigations and prosecutions
of sexual and gender-based crimes. The Deputy Prosecutor herself remains
the overall focal point for sexual and gender-based crimes within the OTP.
Special Gender Adviser Catharine A. MacKinnon also provides special
assistance to the Prosecutor on the subject.312
In addition to the aforementioned actions, the OTP’s approach has been
to ensure that all members of joint teams have knowledge of sexual and
gender-based crimes. The OTP has also sought to make all investigators
knowledgeable of best practices to conduct interviews with victims of

307. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 68(3); see ICC Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, supra note 228, R. 85 & R. 89.
308. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 75.
309. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kony et al.,Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of
Arrest for Joseph Kony, ¶ 7 (Sept. 27, 2005). As this case is on-going, no details can
be provided regarding any information collected during that investigation beyond what
is publicly available.
310. See THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY,
supra note 5, at 5, 7 (stating that a principle guiding Prosecutorial Strategy is that of
“focused investigations and prosecutions”).
311. See Bensouda, supra note 2, at 413-14 (describing the GCU’s strategy of
developing compliance standards, assisting victims in communication with the
Registry, and supporting investigation teams).
312. Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, supra note 6.
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sexual and gender-based crimes (or crime-base witnesses).313 Accordingly,
training has been provided to all members of the teams on the ICC’s legal
framework with regard to sexual and gender-based crimes. In addition, the
GCU coordinated training for all investigators of the Uganda team by
experts outside the OTP. The trainings focused on interview methods and
potential problems in dealing with sexual violence victims. Specific
training was provided as well on methods for interviewing children.
Training was also provided to all members of the joint team on the specific
cultural context within Uganda to ensure their cultural understanding prior
to investigations.
As an additional tool to mainstream the approach to sexual and genderbased crimes during investigations, the OTP, with input from GCU and
external experts in gender issues, drafted guidelines and questionnaires for
the team’s investigators to use during the course of investigation. The
guidelines and questionnaires cover the information required in all
categories of sexual violence and gender-based crimes from all types of
witnesses, namely: victim crime-base witnesses, insiders (i.e. former
members of the LRA), and overview witnesses (including, e.g., police
witnesses).
C. A Focused Approach to Selecting the Factual Context for Investigations
After undertaking pre-analysis of available data, the OTP selected the
appropriate factual contexts in which to focus its investigation in an effort
to adequately reflect the key potential forms of criminality (including
sexual violence and gender-based crimes), different types of victims, and
the link to those initially identified as potentially being the most
responsible for such crimes. In addition, specific information-collection
missions were conducted to collect evidence related to sexual and genderbased crimes.
D. Focused Approach to Selection of Witnesses
The OTP chose witnesses for interviews because of the information they
could provide with regard to the investigation of sexual violence crimes,
including insiders, overview, and crime-based witnesses.
E. Mainstreaming Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes in Witness Interviews
The draft questionnaire, described above, was devised to cover all types
of witnesses, including crime-base, insiders, and overview witnesses. The
purpose of raising questions on sexual and gender-based crimes with all
types of witnesses was to ensure that relevant information was obtained not
only on crime-base evidence, but also to find “linkage” evidence
connecting witnesses to identified suspects, and to collect contextual
evidence regarding the link to the armed conflict and to the widespread or

313. See Bensouda, supra note 2, at 414.
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systematic phenomenon of sexual violence crimes in the Uganda case.
F. The Focused Approach to Preparation for Sexual and Gender-Based
Crime Interviews
Moreover, a very focused approach was taken to selecting witnesses and
preparing for investigative missions to try and avoid having individuals
unnecessarily exposed to ICC staff, unless they had information of value or
were likely to be able to be witnesses. Prior to leaving on mission and
before the final selection of witnesses was made, wherever possible,
investigators sought the following relevant information regarding potential
interviewees’:
•
•
•

likely areas of evidence relevant to sexual crimes and potential
linkage information on identified suspects;
personal security situation; and
psychological and physical health.

In addition, investigators sought to determine in advance, wherever
possible, the interviewees’:
•
•

•
•
•

need for any prior consent to be interviewed from parents or
guardians, where relevant;
interview location needs (i.e. identifying the most suitable
interview location based primarily on security and privacyconfidentiality, and where possible, providing for comfort,
convenience, and familiarity);
any special needs (e.g., childcare during the interview);
preferences for potential support person(s); and
preferences for the team’s gender composition for interviewers
314
and interpreters.

Interpreters in the relevant languages were used. Interpreters were
selected based, where possible, on their prior experience in interpreting for
victims of sexual or gender-based crimes. Interpreters received briefings
before interviews were conducted with crime-base witnesses on methods
for approaching sexual crimes interviews: including adopting nonjudgmental behavior,315 using verbatim translations where possible, and
avoiding the use of euphemisms to describe the sexual acts that took place.
G. A Focused Approach to the Interview Process
1. Prior Informed Consent
Before conducting an interview, the investigator sought prior informed
consent for the interview from the interviewee and from any parent or
314. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 68(1) (requiring that the Court “take
appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical, psychological well-being, dignity
and privacy of victims and witnesses . . . having regard to all relevant factors including
age, gender . . . and the nature of the crime, in particular, but not limited to, where the
crime involves sexual or gender violence . . . . The Prosecutor shall take such measures
particularly during the investigation and prosecution of such crimes.”).
315. See id.
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guardian in the case of children or any other interviewees expressing a wish
for prior family consent. During the introduction by the interviewers,
considerable time was taken to explain the Court and potential
consequences of cooperation, and to ensure informed consent and
voluntariness in undertaking an interview. In particular, special approaches
were used to give explanations during interviews with children and any
others needing more detailed explanations.
2. Prior Assessment
Moreover, before an interview is conducted with a victim of sexual
violence, there is an assessment of their psychological and physical wellbeing, as well as the security of their situation to determine if an interview
is appropriate.
3. Use of Questionnaires
Team members used the questionnaire, which covers all potential sexual
violence and gender-based crimes under the Statute, with all witnesses to
elicit necessary information regarding the witnesses’ experiences of sexual
and gender-based crimes, and the wider context in which those crimes may
have been perpetrated.
4. Support Person(s)
Sexual violence victim witnesses were given the option of having a
support person present during the interview if they wished. In all situations
in which support persons were present, they were advised of the
importance of only being present to support the witness while the witness
recounted his or her experiences and not to respond to questions the
investigators asked.
5. Conducting the Interview
The interviewer of a victim witness followed specified steps in
conducting the interview. At the beginning, the interviewer would seek to
establish a rapport with the witness. The interviewer first elicited a free
narrative from the victim before following up with open-ended and
specific, non-leading questions. The interviewer also considered whether
there were any inconsistencies in the witness’s statement,316 provided
316. Chinkin observed that

judges [on ad hoc tribunals] have been understanding about inconsistencies in
evidence, implicitly rejecting stereotypes of women as unreliable and
hysterical witnesses. They have accepted that inconsistencies can be rationally
explained by the difficulties of recollecting precise details several years later,
trauma, the difficulties of translation, and illiteracy. In the Kunarac Trial
Chamber Judgment, the ICTY accepted that the very nature of the ordeal might
inhibit precise details of the detention, such as the sequence of events, exact
times and dates.
Chinkin, supra note 8, at 126. Chinkin also cites the Furundzija Trial Chamber
Judgment in which the ICTY Trial Chamber found that post-traumatic stress disorder
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sufficient breaks for the witness during the interview, and used diagrams of
the body where necessary, though such use was uncommon. Additionally,
certain questions were adapted to cater to certain cultural and case-specific
aspects, including clarifying distances, dates, and times.
H. The Gendered-Nature of Crimes in Uganda
The information collected in Uganda indicated that some of the crimes
perpetrated by the LRA were gendered in nature.
I. Investigative Challenges
The team conducting the investigation of gender-based crimes in Uganda
faced a number of challenges, including security. The security of the team
was an inherent problem in the context of investigation in an on-going
conflict situation.317 It was also important for the investigative team to
avoid making presumptions in the course of the sexual violence interviews
they conducted. For example, a number of witnesses expressed a
preference for female-only investigative teams. However, some witnesses
stated that they were indifferent, and one female witness initially expressed
a preference for a male-only team. The lesson learned in that situation is
that a victim should be provided the choice of a male or female interviewer,
wherever possible, to ensure that they feel most comfortable sharing their
experiences of sexual violence. Accordingly, it was important that all
investigators, male and female, were trained to conduct sexual violence
interviews with both male and female victims.
The questionnaire the investigative team used to conduct interviews
included questions about the sexual violence experienced by male victims,
including insiders, both as perpetrators and as victims. It is important to
ask questions routinely about sexual and gender-based crimes from all
relevant witnesses, including male insiders of military groups allegedly
perpetrating the crimes, to cover any potential victims, female or male, of
these crimes. For instance, a male forcibly conscripted into a military group
(PTSD) can impact memory and reliability of treatment and that “[t]here is no reason
why a person with PTSD cannot be a perfectly reliable witness.” Id. at 126 n.83; see
also Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case Nos. IT 96-23-I & IT 96-23/1-A, Appeals
Chamber Judgment, ¶ 324 (June 12, 2002); Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case Nos. IT
96-23-T & IT 96-23/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 679 (Feb. 22, 2001); Prosecutor
v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 108-109 (Dec. 10,
1998); Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR 96-13-A, Trial Chamber Judgment &
Sentence, ¶¶ 100-101 (Jan. 27, 2000); KITTICHAISAREE, supra note 135, at 302 (noting
that any inconsistency in the traumatized survivors accounts can be regarded as
indicating truthfulness and absence of interference, and that the ad hoc tribunals have
found no reason why a witness affected by post-traumatic stress disorder cannot be
reliable); MAY & WIERDA, supra note 293, at 170-71, 237 (noting that, in Prosecutor v.
Bagilishema, Case No. ICTR 95-1A-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 24 (June 7, 2001),
the Court found that differences between earlier statements and later testimony in court
could be explained by many factors including “lapse of time, the language used, the
questions put to the witnesses and the interpretation and transcription, and the impact
of trauma on the witness” and opining that “some inconsistency is tolerable and may in
fact speak to the credibility of the evidence”).
317. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 68(1).
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could himself be a victim of sexual crimes or may have crucial information
regarding other victims of such crimes (female or male). In addition to the
challenges interviewers face during the course of an interview, the OTP
must also use necessary forethought to ensure the protection of the witness
after the interview. It has been important to have ongoing follow-up
contact with witnesses to ensure that their security and other needs are met.
J. Prosecutions
1. Charging
The charges in the Arrest Warrants against five of the senior members of
the LRA reflected both sexual violence and gender-based crimes.318 There
were three counts of sexual violence offenses: one count of sexual
enslavement constituting a crime against humanity; one count of rape
constituting a crime against humanity; and one count of inducing rape as a
war crime.319 In addition to those three charges, the five senior members of
the LRA were also charged with one count of the use of child soldiers, a
crime which further reflects the gendered-nature of the LRA’s crimes.320
2. Modes of Liability
In the Uganda case, there were LRA policies regarding sexual and
gender crimes and key suspects were directly involved in committing those
crimes. They were charged with liability under Article 25(3)(a) and (b) of
the Rome Statute.321
V. CONCLUSION
The Court has been granted an important mandate in the investigation
and prosecution of sexual and gender-based crimes under international
criminal law, by virtue of its progressive legal framework. The OTP has
implemented this positive framework and built upon past experience to
ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of sexual and genderbased crimes before the ICC.
The Uganda case has provided some useful lessons for future ICC
investigations.
First, it is extremely important to have assistance
throughout the process from sexual and gender-based crime experts, as well
as to have team- and OTP-wide focal points dealing with these crimes. At

318. Prosecutor v. Kony, Otti, Odhiambo & Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05,
Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony, ¶ 5 (July 8, 2005), Warrant of Arrest for Vincent
Otti, (May 6, 2005), Warrant of Arrest for Okot Odhiambo (July 8, 2005), Warrant of
Arrest for Dominic Ongwen (July 8, 2005) [hereinafter Kony et al., Warrants for
Arest]. The Pre-Trial Chamber II decided to discontinue proceedings against Raska
Lukwiya after confirmation of his death. See Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05-248
(July 11, 2007).
319. Kony et al., Warrants for Arrest, supra note 318, ¶ 5.
320. Id. ¶ 42.
321. Id.
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the same time, it is crucial to mainstream across the whole of every joint
team detailed knowledge of the relevant legal framework for sexual and
gender-based crimes as well as the best practices for conducting interviews
of sexual violence victims and child witnesses. Male and female
investigators must be able to properly conduct sexual violence interviews
and collect all necessary evidence.
Second, it is also important to ensure that investigators collect all of the
key relevant evidence required to establish the elements of the crimes
allegedly committed, and modes of liability for sexual and gender-based
crimes. For this purpose, all investigators must routinely collect evidence
on each of the crimes committed, and from all categories of witnesses: not
just victim crime-base witnesses, but also from insiders and overview
witnesses. By following these methods, the investigative team will conduct
an effective investigation to establish the elements of crimes of sexual and
gender-based crimes. In particular by eliciting:
•

•
•

any personal experiences of the witness of sexual violence and
gender-based crimes (including from any male direct
perpetrator or victim);
“linkage” evidence linking suspects to the crimes, in particular
regarding any role and knowledge of those crimes; and
evidence regarding the wider context, in particular the nexus
between the sexual and gender-based crimes and the wider
armed conflict, and the widespread or systematic nature of those
crimes.

Third, great care should also be taken before an investigation
commences to make the appropriate selections, including the correct
factual incident(s) or context(s) on which to focus investigations of sexual
and gender-based crimes, those most responsible for the crimes, and the
appropriate witnesses to interview. Witness selection will include prior
analysis of available information regarding that witness.
The ICC has built upon lessons learnt and has moved onwards. The dual
focused and mainstreamed approach has been adopted in all ICC
investigations. As a result, important charges regarding sexual and genderbased crimes have been brought, including charges in the Darfur case of
rape as a form of genocide;322 charges in the Central African Republic case
of rape as a crime against humanity and as a war crime, rape constituting
torture as both a crime against humanity and war crime, and rape as the war
crime of outrages upon personal dignity;323 and charges in the second
Democratic Republic of Congo of sexual slavery and rape as both crimes
against humanity and war crimes.324
322. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09 (Mar. 4, 2009);
Prosecutor v. Harun & Abd-al-Rahman, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest
for Ahmad Harun and Abd-al-Rahman, at 3 (May 2, 2007).
323. See Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Warrant of
Arrest for Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Replacing the Warrant of Arrest Issued on
23 May 2008, ¶ 2 (June 10, 2008).
324. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for
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Nevertheless, history will be the ultimate judge as to whether the Court
effectively investigates and prosecutes sexual and gender-based crimes.
Cherif Bassiouni provides a sober reminder regarding investigation and
prosecution of any international crime, equally pertinent to sexual and
gender-based crimes: “if we cannot learn from the lessons of the past and
stop the practice of impunity, we are condemned to repeat the same
mistakes and to suffer their consequences.”325

Germain Katanga, at 6 (July 2, 2007); Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/0401/07, Warrant of Arrest for Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, at 6 (July 6, 2007).
325. See Bassiouni, supra note 10, at 29.
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